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IN THE MATTER OF THE ARBITRATION
A.vARD
UNITED STEELWORKERS OF AMERICA,
LOCAL NO. 12003, AFL-CIO
and

BOSTON GAS COMPANY

The Undersigned, duly designated as the Board of Arbitration in
the above matter, and having duly heard the proofs and allegations of the
above-named parties, make the following AWARD:
The grievance of Cathy Gately, filed by the Union on August 24,
1994 is upheld as follows:
1.

The Company violated the Collective Bargaining Agreement by
transferring the work of cleaning trailers at Everett from
a Local 12003 Attendant to a Local 12007 Attendant.

The

work so transferred shall be returned to the Local 12003
classification.
2.

As it has not been shown that Cathy Gately or any other
Local 12003 Attendant has suffered any monetary damages in
regular pay, the request for a monetary remedy is denied.

Eric J. Schmertz, Chairman
DATED:

April 10, 1996

STATE OF NEW YORK

)

COUNTY OF NEW YORK

)

ss:

I, Eric J. Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my Oath as Chairman
that I am the individual described in and who executed this instrument,
which is my AWARD.

Edward J. Maloney
Concurring in #1
Dissenting from #2
DATED:

April

, 1996

STATE OF MASSACHUSETTS)
COUNTY OF

ss:
)

I, Edward J. Maloney do hereby affirm upon my Oath that I am the
individual described in and who executed this instrument, which is my
AWARD.

Thomas J. Ryan, III
Dissenting from #1
Concurring in #2
DATED:

April

, 1996

STATE OF MASSACHUSETTS)
COUNTY OF

ss:
)

I, Thomas J. Ryan, III do hereby affirm upon my Oath that I am
the individual described in and who executed this instrument, which is my
AWARD.

IN THE MATTER OF THE ARBITRATION
between
OPINION OF CHAIRMAN
UNITED STEELWORKERS OF AMERICA,
LOCAL NO. 12003, AFL-CIO

and
BOSTON GAS COMPANY
-X

The stipulated issue is the grievance of Cathy Gately, filed by
the above-named Union on August 24, 1994.

In substance, the grievance

charges the above-named Company with violations of "Article II, Section 1,
Article I, Section 3" of the Collective Bargaining Agreement by "work
transferred

from Local 12003 to Local 12007."

The remedy sought is

"return work to Local 12003 and make whole for all lost wages."
A

hearing

was

held

on

October

30,

1995

at

Braintree,

Massachusetts, at which time representatives of the Union and Company
appeared.
The Board of Arbitration consisted of Edward J. Maloney, Union
designee; Thomas J. Ryan, III, Company designee; and the Undersigned as
Chairman.

All concerned were afforded full opportunity to offer evidence

and argument and to examine and cross-examine witnesses.

The Oath of the

Arbitrator was waived; a stenographic record of the hearing was taken, and
the parties filed post-hearing briefs.
By

agreement,

correspondence.

the

Board

of

Arbitration

deliberated

by

I conclude that under Article II, Section I of the contract,
implemented by a long-standing past practice of some 23 years, the work of
cleaning trailers at Everett was established and recognized as within the
jurisdiction of the Local 12003 bargaining unit, and more particularly a
job duty of a Local 12003 Building, Grounds and Security Attendant.
In any unilateral change by the Company in the duties of a Local
12003 Attendant, including the elimination or diversion of some cleaning
duties, a contractual distinction must be made between changes within the
12003 bargaining unit (i.e. "intra-unit changes) and those which transfer
the work outside the Local 12003 Unit (i.e. "inter-unit" changes such as
here to a different bargaining unit).
It is my view, as expressed in my paycheck decision that the
Company may make changes in working conditions, including changes in the
duties of a job classification, under Article XIII, Section 3 of the
contract.

But, it is my interpretation of that Article and Section that

it contemplates and applies to changes within the Local 12003 bargaining
unit (i.e. intra-unit changes).
made

by

the

Those changes, if insubstantial may be

Company unilaterally.

If

substantial,

the

notice and

discussion provisions of that Section must be followed.
As an integral part of the Local 12003 contract, I conclude that
Article XIII, Section 3 is per force limited in its application to work
within that Union's recognition (i.e. "intra-union changes") and was not
intended

and

does

not

extend

to

the

divestiture

of

Local

12003

jurisdiction by its transfer to a different bargaining unit or to some
other outside source.

Any other interpretation would give the Company a

license

to

erode

the

Local

12003 work

jurisdiction

unilaterally by

"insubstantial" changes and after notice and discussion, by "substantial"
changes.

I am not persuaded that Article III, Section 3 was negotiated

with that reach intended; nor, therefore, should it be so interpreted.
The

"change" that the Company effectuated and which is the

subject of this case was not a change within the meaning and intent of
Article III, Section 3.

Rather it was an "inter-unit" change —

the

transfer of work historically performed by Local 12003 Attendants to an
Attendant(s) in Local 12007, a different bargaining unit.

Clearly, an

inter-unit transfer of this type encroaches on and constitutes an erosion
(no matter how small) of the certified jurisdictional rights of Local
12003, mutually recognized for so long by an unvaried practice.
The Union's brief quotes
parties by Arbitrator Abraham Siegel.

from a 1984 decision between the
I agree with that quotation.

Arbitrator Siegel said inter alia;
"The Preamble and recognition clause langucige only assures that
the job duties incorporated in the listed classification shall
not be exported from the bargaining unit.

If they no longer

exist, given changes in need (for whatever legitimate business
reason) or

if they

are transferred

from one place in the

bargaining unit to another or if they are changed, all this is
permissible..." (Emphasis added)
Applied to this case, the Company retained a managerial right to
move the duties of the affected Local 12003 Attendant, to other Attendants
or even to other classifications within the Local 12003 bargaining unit,
pursuant to the provisions of Article XIII, Section 3.
discontinued

those

duties

or

merged

them

with

Or it could have
other

classifications within the Local 12003 bargaining unit.

duties

of

But what it may

not do, against the backdrop of the Recognition Clause, the 23 years of
practice and the foregoing contractual interpretation of Article XIII,
Section 3, is to remove work from Local 12003 entirely, by transferring it
to another bargaining unit —

Local 12007.

significantly

transferring

different

from

In my view that is not
bargaining

unit

work

to

managerial or supervisory employees or improperly subcontracting it —
circumstances proscribed by prior, cited arbitration Awards.
The justifications for the transfer argued by the Company,
namely legitimate business needs, greater efficiency, on-site supervision,
less required travel time, equalization of the work loads of Attendants of
both bargaining units and the de minimis quantity of the work transferred,
all apply to changes within the unit, but are not circumstances which
allow the permanent removal from the bargaining unit of work contractually
and historically recognized as belonging to the jurisdiction of that unit.
In

short,

the

contractual

prohibition on a permanent

loss

of work

jurisdiction belonging to Local 12003 cannot be ignored by an Arbitrator
bound to uphold the contract merely because the quantity of the work
transferred

is 1 1/2 hours a week

Attendant's

work

load)

or

is

(i.e. less than 1/2 of 1% of the

more

equitable

jurisdiction or more efficient and productive.

to

the

12007

A contract breach — here

the divesting of some Local 12003 work to another unit —
in arbitration by those justifications.

Local

cannot be cured

Finally, in the absence of any challenge from Local 12007 or a
full exposition of the facts, I cannot deem as precedential the examples
cited by the Company of transfers of work or personnel from Local 12007 to
Local 12003.

Indeed, I do not have jurisdiction over actions under the

Local 12007 contract.
Accordingly, the grievance of Cathy Gately, filed by the Union
on August 24, 1994, is sustained to the extent set forth in the AWARD.

Eric J. Schmertz, Chairman
DATED:

April 10, 1996

ERIC J.

SCHMERTZ
275

MADISON AVENUE

NEW YORK. NEW YORK

I OO I 6-

HOFSTRA UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW
HEMPSTEAD, NEW YORK

I :55O

(5 I 6) 463-5864

March 26, 1996

Mr. Edward J. Maloney
Vice-President
United Steelworkers of America
Local 12003
48 Thomas Road
South Weymouth, Massachusetts 02190
Mr. Thomas J. Ryan, III
Director, Industrial Relations
Boston Gas Company
One Beacon Street
Boston, Massachusetts
02108
Re:

United Steelworkers of America, Local 12003
-and- Boston Gas Company
(Building and Grounds Attendant Work Transfer)

Gentlemen:
I enclose to both of you a copy of the proposed Award and
my Opinion in the above matter.
May I have your views within the next few days as the
Award is due on or before April 17th.
Very

Cha
EJS/ps
Enclosure

_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . » _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ —V

N THE MATTER OF THE ARBITRATION
between
AWARD
NITED STEELWORKERS OF AMERICA,
,OCAL NO. 12003, AFL-CIO
and

OSTON GAS COMPANY
___

"V

The Undersigned, duly designated as the Board of Arbitration in
he above matter and having duly heard the proofs and allegations of the
bove-named parties, makes the following AWARD:
1.

There was just cause for the six-day suspension of John
Houlihan.

2.

There was just cause for the three-day suspensions of Paul
Carey and Joseph Ahl.

3.

The

demotion

of

John

Houlihan

to

the

classification

equipment operator from May 9, 1994 to the date of this
Award, is upheld.
4.

The

"permanence"

of

Houlihan's

demotion

is

lifted.

Effective immediately, and under the terms of the contract,
he shall have the right to exercise his seniority for
restoration to the job of crew leader or for any other job
for which he would be eligible under the contract.

Eric J. Schmertz, Chairman
ATED:

February 2, 1996

TATE OF NEW YORK
OUNTY OF NEW YORK

)
ss:
)

I, Eric J. Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my Oath as Chairman
hat I am the individual described in and who executed this instrument,
hich is my AWARD.
Mark Smith
Concurring in #1, #2, and #3
(Concurring in #4)
(Dissenting from #4)
ATED:

February

, 1996

TATE OF MASSACHUSETTS)
ss :
:OUNTY OF

)

I, Mark Smith do hereby affirm upon my Oath that I am the
ndividual described in and who executed this instrument, which is my
.WARD.
Stephen Finnigan
Dissenting from #1, #2, #3
Concurring in #4
ATED:

February

, 1996

TATE OF MASSACHUSETTS)
ss :
:OUNTY OF

)

I, Stephen Finnigan do hereby affirm upon my Oath that I am the
ndividual described in and who executed this instrument, which is my
.WARD.

-X

N THE MATTER OF THE ARBITRATION
between
OPINION OF CHAIRMAN
NITED STEELWORKERS OF AMERICA,
OCAL NO. 12003, AFL-CIO
and

OSTON GAS COMPANY
-X

The stipulated issue is:
Was the discipline of John Houlihan, Paul Carey and
Joseph Ahl for just cause?

If not what shall be the

remedy?
Hearings
ndersigned

were

held

before

a

Board

of

Arbitration

as Chairman and Messrs. Stephen Finnigan

espectively the Union and Company designees.

of the

and Mark Smith,

Representatives

of the

bove-named Union and Company appeared, as did Messrs. Houlihan, Carey and
hi,

hereinafter

ndividually

as

referred

to

"Houlihan,"

collectively

"Carey"

and

as

the

"Ahl."

"grievants,"

All

concerned

and
were

fforded full opportunity to offer evidence and argument and to examine
nd cross-examine witnesses.
The Oath of the Arbitrators was waived; a stenographic record of
he hearings was taken and the parties filed post-hearing briefs.
greement,

the

Board

of

Arbitration

deliberated

by

telephone

By
and

:orrespondence, and met together in executive session on February 1, 1996.
Let me come right to the essential point, as I see it.
hink that this matter would have come to arbitration

I do not

if the charges

gainst the grievants did not include, primarily, the allegation that they

vere asleep in their truck when assigned to and when they should have been
actively working to locate and repair a Grade I1 gas leak during the early
norning hours of April 27, 1994.
Though

the

grievants

are

also

charged

with

poor

work

Derformance, particularly the assertion that they did little if any work
the assignment, and that what work they did, if any, was not in
accordance with prescribed methods and procedures, I am satisfied that the
Denalties imposed would be appropriate, with some modification, if the
•sleeping" allegation is proved, irrespective of the other charges.

Only

Lf that "threshold" charge is not established need I make determinations
n the others and judge the appropriateness of the discipline imposed as
o them.
I accept as accurate and credible the testimony of Paul McGrath
he Company's District

Supervisor.

Based on that

testimony

and the

vidence of the circumstances surrounding what McGrath saw, I conclude
hat the grievants were asleep in their truck; that Houlihan was asleep
;ith his boots off and not just resting from a toothache or drying his
ocks; and that Carey and Ahl were not "cleaning up the truck" but rather
wakened and exited from the back of the truck over the front seats when
McGrath

awakened

liscovered asleep.

Houlihan,

in

an

apparent

attempt

to

avoid

being

I accept McGrath's testimony that he awoke Houlihan

fter observing him asleep for several minutes and that the rear of the
;ruck (where Carey and Ahl were located) was quiet and dark.

In short, I

ind no credible reason why McGrath would falsify this testimony.2

'it is undisputed that a Grade 1 gas leak is the most
serious type and dangerous to the area where it is present.
2The Union's reliance on an incident during the 1993 lockout
when McGrath was hit with a tomato is not evidence of bias
because McGrath knew that another employee, not Houlihan, threw
the tomato.

I

must

reject

also

the

Union's

claim,

on

behalf

of the

grievants, that they were in their truck, after aerating the location of
the leak, simply awaiting the outcome of the aeration.

The Company has

>ersuasively shown that when aerating, the repair crew is to actively
monitor

the

effects

geographical area.

of the

aeration on the

affected

buildings and

They are not to relax their efforts at that time.

In

any event, sleeping during any such period is manifestly improper.
Houlihan who was the crew leader was suspended for six days and
>ermanently demoted to his former classification. Carey and Ahl, the crew
members, each received three-day suspensions.
Considering the dangerous nature of a Grade I leak and the
grievants' misconduct of sleeping or "cooping" when they should have been
at work, I cannot find the respective suspensions of six days and three
days to be too harsh, inappropriate or without just cause.
Additionally, I cannot fault the removal of Houlihan from his
crew leadership, nor do I find contractual fault with the Company's
imposition of a demotion.

Despite his long service with the Company, it

is clear that he defaulted on his leadership responsibilities as a crew
leader.

He permitted conduct by himself and his crew, which not only

ignored the dangerous conditions present due to the Grade I leak, but
abdicated his fundamental duty to direct his crew in containing and
liminating that danger.

Contractually, he was still in a probationary

status in that particular job as crew leader.

The contract gives the

Company the right to "demote" as well as discipline employees "for just
cause." Article III Section I makes clear that "demotion" may be resorted
to for disciplinary reasons.
responsibilities

Inability or unwillingness to carry out the

of a crew leader, particularly

under the

ircumstances of this case, constitute cause for "demotion."

dangerous
I conclude

that the Company demoted Houlihan as a disciplinary penalty, not because
he was still in his probationary period, though the Company asserted this
latter point as well.
The Union argues that the demotion should be reversed on the
grounds of "disparate" treatment.

The parties submitted a stipulation

.isting cases in which employees were disciplined for work infractions but
not demoted.

And other cases in which the affected employee was demoted.

So the bare practice has been both ways and mixed.

I do not have enough

information about the former cases of discipline to determine if any of
those employees were similarly situated to Houlihan.

It appears that only

one was a crew leader, and the nature of his two suspensions were not
disclosed.

I cannot tell if his misconduct or work failures were as

serious as Houlihan's inattention to a Grade I gas leak.
is

insufficient

evidence

to establish

that

Therefore, there

Houlihan's

demotion

was

•disparate" treatment.
The Union's argument that the job Houlihan should have been
returned to under Article XI of the contract was as a "crew leader" and
not as an equipment operator is neither logical nor persuasive.

It would

nullify not only the effectiveness of the demotion, but in this case, its
express purpose and justification.
Finally, however, I find no support in the contract or in
practice for a "permanent" demotion.
redemption.

I believe in rehabilitation and

Houlihan has been in demoted status since May of 1994.

As a

disciplinary penalty that is long enough for the offense committed.
Accordingly, the "permanence" of Houlihan's demotion is lifted,
ffective immediately, and under the terms of the contract he shall have
the right to exercise his seniority for restoration to the job of crew

.eader or for any other job for which he would be eligible under the
:ontract.

Eric J ./chmertz, Chairman
DATED:

February 2, 1996

AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION,
ADMINISTRATOR
-X

N THE MATTER OF THE ARBITRATION
between
OPINION AND AWARD
Case # 52-300-0063695

BEW LOCAL 1400
and

IITIZENS GAS & COKE UTILITY
-X

The stipulated issue is:
Was TIMOTHY KIRKPATRICK, entitled to a negotiated
disability benefit increase?

If so, what remedy is

proper?
A hearing was held in Indianapolis, Indiana on May 17, 1996 at
time Mr. Kirkpatrick (hereinafter referred to as the "grievant") and
representatives

of the

above-named Union and Company appeared.

All

concerned were afforded full opportunity to offer evidence and argument
and to examine and cross examine witnesses.

The Arbitrators Oath was

waived; a stenographic record of the hearing was taken; and the parties
filed post-hearing briefs.
More precisely, the question posed is whether, while still on
disability, the grievant was entitled to a change in the disability
benefit which was negotiated and made "effective" during his period of
disability,

and which

if applicable to him would have increased his

disability entitlement?
The grievant became disabled on March 23, 1995 and began to
receive disability benefits on March 30, 1995.

At that point, under the

then applicable 1993-1995 Collective Bargaining Agreement, his disability

senefit was 75 percent of his base hourly rate, with a maximum "cap" of
?425 a week.

He received the $425 a week maximum and that entitlement,

ipplicable at that time, is not disputed. The grievant's disability ended
)n September 25, 1995, and he returned to work on that date.
During
legotiated

the

the

grievant's

current

1995-1999

period

of

Collective

disability
Bargaining

the

parties

Agreement,

ddendum "A" thereof reads:
DISABILITY;
First six months

- 72% Base Rate - no cap

Second six months - 65% Base Rate - no cap
Effective date is June 12, 1995
If applicable to the grievant, the removal of the "cap" and the
ipplication of the 72% would result in an increase in his disability
aenefit from the "capped" $425 a week to an "uncapped" $518.11.
It is the position of the Union that because the foregoing
Addendum

"A" made the benefit change "effective June 12, 1995," the

jrievant was entitled to an increase to $518.11 from that effective date.
En

support

of

its position, the Union points out that the improved

disability benefit was "paid for" by the grievant and all bargaining unit
smployees in lieu of an additional wage increase in the amount of .5 cents
oer hour.

And that therefore, because the newly negotiated disability

Denefit has a "cost factor" and diminished the potential wage increase by
.5 cents an hour, the grievant's entitlement to an improved disability
oenefit was not only justified by the contractual effective date of June
2, 1995 but, significantly, supported by a monetary consideration.
The Company does not deny the . 5 cents an hour cost value of the
improved disability benefit.

In citing the adjustments made under the new contract in the
'hrift Plan. Pensions, Life Insurance, and Health Care Coverage, the Union
points out that the effective date of each (except the Thrift Plan which
equired IRS approval) was June 12, 1995, and that for each there was a
cost factor that otherwise could have gone into wages.
Finally, the Union rejects any reliance by the Company on "past
practice."

Because of the Union's policy not to "seek out" grievances,

mt to wait until an employee formally complains, the Union asserts that
it could not and did not know of any prior cases where an improved
disability benefit was not made applicable to an employee who was on
disability when the improved benefit was made contractually effective.
The Company's case is essentially based on past practice.

It

slaced into the record evidence of a substantial number of examples where
a new disability benefit was not made applicable to these on disability,
jut rather applicable only prospectively to those who became disabled on
or after the effective date of the newly negotiated benefit.

The Company

argues that it is "incredulous" to believe that the Union and its members
did not know of this long-standing and unvaried practice.

And that at no

time during the most recent or prior contract negotiations did the Union
seek to change the way Addendum "A" was and had been applied. The Company
concludes that the Union and the employees thereby knew of and accepted
Addendum "A" as implemented by the Company, historically

and in the

instant case.
I conclude that Addendum "A" in the current contract, and
particularly the reference to an effective date of June 12, 1995 is

ambiguous.

I find that there are no provisions

in prior

contracts,

including prior Addendum "A's" which clarify or resolve that ambiguity,
tfith equal validity, the improved benefit could be interpreted two ways.
It could apply to all disabled employees, those on disability before June
12, 1995 and those who became disabled thereafter.

Contrariwise, it could

lave been intended to apply prospectively, namely to those employees who
became disabled on an after June 12, 1995.
I do not find the precedents cited by the Union with regard to
the Thrift Plan, Pensions. Life Insurance and Health Care coverage helpful
in resolving the ambiguity.

Aside from the argument that these changed

benefits were "effective June 12, 1995" there is no evidence in the record
as to how they were implemented and whether any of them have relevance to
employees similarly situated to those on disability.
effective

date of June 12, 1995 for a new Thrift

I do not see how an
Plan or for Life

[nsurance or for Health Care premiums, all obviously applicable to active
employees,

and

all

effective

prospectively,

represent

circumstances

similar to the application of a new disability benefit to employees
already on disability.

Pensions may have a precedential relevance.

But

:he record does not contain probative evidence on how the new Pension
entitlement

was

implemented -- whether

applicable only to employees

retiring after June 12, 1995 or applicable also to those already retired.
Nor do I find dispositive the fact that the employees gave up .5
cents an hour in potential wages to gain the improved disability benefit.
The Union's contention

in that regard begs the question.

question is what did the . 5 cents an hour buy?

The real

Did it buy an improved

aenefit for all those disabled or was it calculated, actuarial, on what it

would cost prospectively for those who became disabled on or after the
effective date?

The record is devoid of any evidence of the former, so

the cost of .5 cents cannot be definitively determined as a cost attendant
to those, like the grievant, already on disability.
That
ambiguity.

leaves the question of how to resolve

the continuing

Traditionally, arbitrators look to the negotiation history

and/or to past practice for answers.
Here, the negotiation history is unavailing. It is acknowledged
by

both

sides

that

there were

no discussions

or understandings

at

negotiations regarding to which class of disabled employees any changed
disability benefits would apply on its effective date.
However, there is considerable evidence of past practice.

And

it is well-settled that an unvaried and extensive practice is probative
evidence of how the parties understood the meaning and intent of contract
Language which, on its face, is ambiguous.
Here

the

extensive

past

practice

supports

the

Company's

interpretation and implementation of Addendum "A" and particularly its
effective date.

Without exception, no employee on disability before a

negotiated charge in the benefit, and still on disability thereafter,
received the improved rate.
receive

the amount

they

Rather, employees so situated continued to

received when they

began their disability,

regardless of any negotiated increase thereafter.

Indeed, supportive of

this practice, is evidence of one case where the negotiated benefit
decreased, but on employee already on disability did not have his benefit
reduced on the effective date of the changed benefit, but retained the
higher amount he received when his disability began.

That

this practice was

open, unvaried

duration leads to only one logical conclusion.

and of considerable
And that is that the

employees and the Union knew of it actually or at least constructively,
and are hence bound.

Therefore, the practice

constitutes

probative

evidence of what the parties believed the proper application of Addendum
•A" to be and accepted that application as their mutual interpretation and
meaning.
Accordingly,

I

find

no

contractual

basis

to

reverse

the

Company's denial of an improved disability benefit to Timothy Kirkpatrick.
The Undersigned, duly designated as the Arbitrator in the above
matter and having duly heard the proofs and allegations of the above-named
jarties, makes the following AWARD:
TIMOTHY KIRKPATRICK was not entitled to a negotiated
disability benefit increase.

Eric J. Schmertz, Arbitrator

DATED:

August 21, 1996

STATE OF NEW YORK

)

COUNTY OF NEW YORK

)

ss:

I, Eric J. Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my Oath as Arbitrator
that I am the individual described in and who executed this instrument,
which is my AWARD.

AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION,
ADMINISTRATOR
-X

IN THE MATTER OF THE ARBITRATION
between
LOCAL 701, INTERNATIONAL UNION OF
ELECTRONIC, ELECTRICAL, SALARIED
MACHINE AND FURNITURE WORKERS,
AFL-CIO

OPINION AND AWARD
CASE # 11 E 3000173195

and
GENERAL ELECTRIC COMPANY
-X

The stipulated issue is:
Was there just cause for the discharge of JOSEPH R.
KANE?
A
Kentucky,

If not, what shall be the remedy?

hearing was

at which

held

time Mr.

"grievant" and representatives
appeared.

on January

24,

1996

Kane, hereinafter

in Madisonville,

referred

to

as the

of the above-named Union and Company

All concerned were afforded full opportunity to offer evidence

and argument and to examine and cross-examine witnesses.

The Arbitrator's

Oath was waived, and the parties filed post-hearing briefs.
The grievant was discharged

for committing an assault on a

fellow employee (Tim Moore), in violation of the Company's Code of Plant
Conduct —

specifically a prohibition on "Fighting, otherwise assaulting,

or willfully attempting to injure anyone on Company property..."This
prohibition is listed among the offenses for which "discharge may be
imposed."
The

propriety

of

such

a rule

is not

seriously

disputed.

Manifestly, orderliness and discipline in the work place and the safety

and morale of employees justifies the proscription against fighting and
assaults.
or

And unless an assault or a fight is in unavoidable self defense

excused

significant

because

of pronounced

mitigating

provocation,

circumstances,

the

or

penalty

subject
of

to other

discharge

is

warranted.
In the instant case the facts and evidence as adduced in the
record show that the grievant's attack and assault on Moore was violent,
physically extreme and dangerous.

The weight of the credible testimony

reveals that with both hands and from behind the grievant grabbed Moore
around the neck, pulled him forcefully from a chair dragged him across the
plant's Electronic Maintenance Repair Room to a wall or a desk by the
wall, and held him by the neck until the verbal intervention of one or
more fellow employees caused the grievant to release him.
The testimony of other employees who witnessed the event and the
evident redness

observed

by a witness

on Moore's

neck

support the

foregoing facts about the assault and its magnitude.
The charge against the grievant also includes the allegation
that

later, after Moore told him that he'd report the incident to

management or that he "could have (the grievant's) job" for what the
grievant did, the grievant "threatened to kill" Moore, by stating that he
"knew where (Moore) lived" and "it wouldn't bother me to kill you."
It is obvious that under these facts and circumstances, the
grievant violated the aforesaid work rule.
in that regard has been met.

The Company's burden of proof

The burden of proving that the assault was

justified or should be excused or that the penalty of discharge should be
mitigated, shifts to the grievant and the Union on his behalf.

To meet that burden, the grievant and the Union assert that the
grievant was provoked by Moore not only at the time of the assault but
over the years of their employment together.

Specifically, the grievant

and the Union contend that Moore regularly "harassed" the grievant on the
job; removed the grievant's work from the computer; removed and tore up
the grievant's photographs of his wife and grandchildren and/or punched
out the eyes of those photographs, and continuously acted toward the
grievant in a "nasty, condescending, 'better than you' and provocative"
manner.

It is also asserted that the grievant complained about Moore's

attitude towards him and the adversarial relationship between them to
supervision, and that supervision did nothing about it.
the assault

At the time of

the grievant and the Union claim that a sarcastic and

contemptuous response by Moore to a question from the grievant, triggered
the assault.

The claim is that upon entering the Electronic Repair room

the grievant asked Moore if he "was still meddling with things not of your
concern," (referring to the removal of programs on the computer) and that
Moore replied

"might be."

It is explained

that this confirmed the

grievant's belief that Moore had willfully and maliciously removed from
the computer programs on which the grievant had been working, and that,
against a backdrop of months, if not years of harassment, provoked the
grievant's anger and the assault.
There is substantial evidence in the record which leads to a
belief that there was a long-standing personality conflict between the
grievant and Moore.

Indeed, there is evidence supportive of the

assertions that the grievant was "a bully" and that Moore was "arrogant,
ondescending and difficult to work with."

No doubt their personalities

were at odds with each other and that they disliked each other.
But

the

evidence

falls

short

of

establishing

that

Moore

committed any of the specific acts which the grievant claims provoked his
anger and the assault.

The grievant testified that he believed Moore

removed his programs from the computer; that he believed that Moore was
responsible for tearing up or defacing the grievant's photographs of his
wife and grandchildren.

Not only does Moore deny these allegations but

there is no direct evidence either by the grievant or by any other witness
that Moore did these things.
personal

"games"

Moore admitted that he removed certain

from the computer, which were placed there by the

grievant (and others) because they "filled up" the computer with non-work
related material.

But that is not the removal of work programs on which

the grievant was working, and as such, even if it angered the grievant,
was not a provocative justification for the assault.
So, while the record supports suspicions about Moore activities
and

an arguable

theory

that the grievant's beliefs were not wholly

fanciful, the evidence does not meet the clear and convincing standard to
support a conclusion that Moore did the provocative acts charged.

So, the

defense of provocation falls short of the requisite proof to rebut the
established proof of the assault and its violation of the Code of Conduct.
However, there is a factor in this case which does not justify
the assault or otherwise
relevant responsibility

excuse the grievant but which imputes some

to management.

I deem it to be a mitigating

factor in consideration of the penalty of discharge.

4

Despite

the

denials

of supervisor

Ortt

that

the grievant

complained about Moore, I am persuaded by the testimony of others and by
the obvious extended and notorious adversariness between the grievant and
Moore, that supervision and management could not have been ignorant of the
negative relationship between them; that the "personality conflict" was
made known to supervision (and hence management) even if the grievant did
not register specific complaints and that the Company had a managerial
duty in maintaining efficient operations, employee morale and the safety
of the work place to take steps to defuse what I believe they knew or
should have known was a potentially explosive relationship between the
:wo.

Indeed, where there is notice or knowledge of such a situation, the

Company cannot ignore it, relying only on its disciplinary rule against
fighting or committing an assault.

It has a duty, in support of that

Droper rule, to warn employees who are in conflict with each other that a
physical "flare-up" will not be tolerated, and to take other steps,
including, if practicable, separating the work areas of the conflicting
employees to reduce the chance of direct confrontation. In short, because
I believe and conclude that supervision knew of the "bad blood" between
the grievant and Moore, and did nothing to ease or defuse the tensions,
the Company was, in some measure, "contributorily negligent." This is not
to say that the Company could have prevented the assault.

Rather it is to

say that the Company should have taken some reasonable steps to try to
head it off.
This does not mean that the grievant was justified in attacking
Moore.

He should have complained further to supervision and also, and

probably especially, to his Union, and not engage in "self help."

It does

not mean that he is excused from the consequences of the assault.

It

means only that the penalty for the assault (and the verbal and obviously
reprehensible threat that followed subsequently)1 should be mitigated to
something less than discharge.

This mitigation is supported by the fact

that the official record does not show the grievant to be a future threat
to co-workers.

That in a phone call following a written psychological

evaluation a counselor characterized the grievant as "a big bully" is
self-serving and gratuitous because that was not the written diagnosis.
Rather, the psychological report states that"...it is felt that Mr. Kane
would not present a direct danger to anyone in his place of employment."
(emphasis added)

Consistent with my view that the Company should have

taken steps to avoid the "conflict" the psychological report goes on to
state:
"If he

should

retain his

job, then

it would

be

important to have him document any conflicts that he
might have with fellow co-workers and undergo some
type of mediation process." (Emphasis added)
In short, an authoritative psychological report did not conclude
that the assault, albeit violent and inexcusable, meant that the grievant
was a violent personality and a danger if re-employed.
The Undersigned, duly designated as the Arbitrator, and having
duly heard the proofs and allegations of the above-named parties, makes
the following AWARD:
The discharge of Joseph R. Kane is reduced to a
disciplinary

suspension.

He shall be

reinstated

without back pay.

JI deem the verbal threat to be part of the grievant's
emotional outburst. There is no evidence of an intent to carry
it out.

The period of time from his discharge on October 17,
1994

until

his

reinstatement

shall

be

deemed

disciplinary suspension for the offense charged.

a
He

is warned that any future acts of violence or threats
of violence on his part would be grounds for immediate
discharge.

Eric J. Schmertz, Arbitrator
DATED:

March 18, 1996

STATE OF NEW YORK

)

COUNTY OF NEW YORK

ss:
)

I, Eric J. Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my Oath as Arbitrator
that I am the individual described in and who executed this instrument,
which is my AWARD.

AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION,
DMINISTRATOR
-x

N THE MATTER OF THE ARBITRATION
between
OPINION AND AWARD
Case No. 11-300-00895-95

UE LOCAL 359
and

ENERAL ELECTRIC COMPANY

The stipulated issue is:
1.

Did the grievant, MAURICE LAVIGNE have the
minimum qualifications required under the
provisions of Section 1 of Article XXVIII
of the National Agreement or the Local Job
Posting and Upgrading Understanding to be
upgraded
to the Craft
Leader/Planner
position in October 1994?

2.

If the Arbitrator determines that the
grievant
did
have
the
minimum
qualifications required for such upgrading,
did the Company violate Article XXVIII of
the National Agreement or the Local Job
Posting and Upgrading Understanding when it
upgraded
Lawrence
Williams,
Donald
Blakeslee,
James
Rebhun
and
Patrick
McCauley rather than the grievant?
If so
what shall the remedy be?

A hearing was held in Albany, New York on October 11, 1995 at
hich time representatives of the above-named Union and Company appeared.
nhe

grievant

was

also

present.

All

concerned

were

afforded

full

pportunity to offer evidence and argument and to examine and crossjxamine witnesses.

The Arbitrator's Oath was waived, a stenographic

•ecord of the hearing was taken and the parties filed post-hearing briefs.
To come right to the point, the issue centers on whether a
/ritten test administered by the Company as a method of determining
jualifications under the aforesaid contract provision, and which the

rievant failed under the scoring standards set by the Company, was fair,
easonable, relevant to the job in question and non-discriminatory, and
hether it should have been determinative in disqualifying the grievant,
rom further consideration?
In September 1994, the Company established as a bargaining unit
ob the position Craft Leader/Planner,1 and posted ten such positions for
ids.

Sixty-six bargaining unit employees bid on the openings, including

he grievant.
The Company inaugurated and implemented a multi-step process in
etermining the minimum qualifications of the bidders.

In order, the

teps were a self-screening evaluation, an aptitude test, a written skills
est and interviews.

The grievant survived the first three steps.

By the

ime of the written test, the original sixty-six applicants had been
educed to twenty-nine candidates, including the grievant.
ine took the written test.

Those twenty-

Seven failed, including the grievant.

articipation in the selection process ended at that point.

His

Ultimately

he ten openings were filled by other bidders who passed the written test
nd the interviews, and some were junior in seniority to the grievant.
The

Union

does not

challenge the multi-step

process.

It

cknowledges the right of the Company to administer a written test as part
f that process in determining minimum qualifications.
ts

challenge

bjectivity

of

in this
the

case

test

as

is to

the

applied

fairness,
to

the

Its objection and

reasonableness

grievant

and

to

and
the

onclusiveness the Company attached to it in disqualifying the grievant
rom further consideration for the job opening.
It is the Union's position that the test was "slanted" in favor
f bidders who had previously performed the job on a temporary basis; that

Earlier it was a managerial classification.

2

he passing grade of 75% was too high; that more than two questions should
ave been disregarded in scoring the test and if done so, the grievant's
score would have reached 75%.

And the foregoing notwithstanding the

frievant's unblemished work record of 22 years, his computer skills, his
ixcellent recordkeeping skills, his demonstrated aptitude (having passed
he aptitude test) and his good health should have been but were not
:onsidered by the Company in assessing his minimum qualifications.
All considered, the Union contends that the Company's actions
md determinations were not only unfair, unreasonable and discriminatory,
)ut arbitrary and capricious.
There is no dispute over the equal and uniformed administration
f the test to the bidders, nor is there any allegation that each test was
lot equally and uniformly scored.
It is apparent to me that the test was relevant to the duties of
;he job, Craft Leader/Planner.

The duties of the job, and the job posting

included

knowledge

requirements

engineering

standards,

of

a

OSHA

and

regulations,

understanding
ISO

guidelines,

of

plant

standard

laintenance operating procedures and the modification review process.

The

;est questions were geared to these subjects.
Though as a practical matter, bidders who previously worked in
:he job may have had experiences which aided them in answering questions
ibout the job's duties and required knowledge, I cannot conclude that the
Company "slanted" the test in their favor, or that the consequences of the
:est scores evidenced any such "slant."

The fact is that 11 of the 22

candidates who passed the exam had no prior experience in the job.
)ther 11 did; so the pass rate for both group was equal.

The

Also, the

statistics showed that the failure rate among those with and without prior
experience was reasonable close (21 1/2% to 26 1/2%).

Additionally the

ecord

indicates

not

only

that

the

grievant

was

informed

of

the

ubstantive nature of the test and the subject matter to be expected, but
hat study and research material on those subjects were made available for
'reparation.
I cannot conclude that the 75% passing grade was too high.

I

ail to see how a lesser grade would demonstrate the requisite knowledge
>f the job functions.

How far below 75% could the break point go?

To

peculate on or indulge in that would be for the arbitrator to substitute
.is judgement on the passing score for that of the Company.

And he should

iot do that unless the passing score set by the Company was unreasonable
>r unjustified.

I do not find 75% to be either.

The Union argues that 75% is too high because a "trial run" of
.he test among qualified exempt employees who had experience on the job
?hen it was a managerial position, resulted in an average score of only
6%.

Again the difference of 11% is a judgmental matter.

But for a test

rith 60 questions, it is not an insignificant differential.

In short, to

~ix the passing grade at 75% for the bidder, when experienced personnel
.cored 86%, is not arbitrary or lacking in acceptable rationale.
Because all the candidates missed two particular questions

—

luestions 7 and 57, the Company eliminated those questions from the
scoring

of

all

the

exams.

Obviously

jrievant's score would have been lower.

had

57 raised his score to 70%.

4

been

included, the

So he and the other candidates

/ere treated equally and fairly in that regard.
zhe 60 questions for a score of 66.66%.

they

The grievant missed 20 of

Given credit for questions 7 and

The Union points out that 25 of the testers missed questions 2
nd 54 and 24 missed question 39, and argues that had the grievant (and
'resumably the others), been given credit for those the grievant's score
ould have exceeded the threshold 75%.
Unless questions 2, 54 and 39 are shown to be unreasonable,
mbiguous, unfair, irrelevant or discriminatory, the Arbitrator has no
uthority to ignore them or to re-score the exam.

None of these fatal

haracteristics were shown by the Union in this record.

Therefore, those

uestions must remain as part of the exam and included in the scoring.
For all the foregoing reasons, I find no basis or authority to
nvalidate the test as it was applied to the grievant.
The remaining question is whether his failure of the test should
.ave disqualified him from further consideration in the selection process,
'he answer to that question is found in the well-settled application of
he "Wirtz formula."

That "formula" is precedential in the interpretation

.nd application of Section I of Article XXVIII of the contract.
>rior decision of January 23, 1984
.iscussed the "Wirtz formula."

In my

(cited by the Company herein) I

My application to the facts therein are

elevant to the facts in the instant case.

Therein I stated:

As I see it, the Wirtz formula is not inconsistent
with my often expressed view, shared I believe by the
large majority of arbitrators, that in matters of
ability and qualifications, the employer's judgement
enjoys a presumption of validity unless shown to be
arbitrary, capricious, discriminatory or unreasonable.
In the instant case, applying the Wirtz formula and
the foregoing view, I conclude that the Company's
determination that the grievant did not possess the
threshold qualifications for Control Operator MCS-2,
should be affirmed.
Assuming that in the first step of his two step
formula, Arbitrator Wirtz interpreted "minimally
qualified" to mean "an ability to perform the job
passably," I do not find that the grievant's

disqualification on that basis was arbitrary,
capricious, discriminatory or unreasonable.
The Union has not clearly and convincingly shown that
the grievant's good work record in other jobs gave him
the type of knowledge and experience that was
transferable to the Control Operator position to
reasonably
insure
his
ability
to perform
it
"passably."
On the other hand, I cannot find the
methods employed by the Company in judging the
grievant's qualifications to be wrong. The questions
which supervision posed to the grievant in considering
his bid were fully related to the job and its duties
and responsibilities as listed in the posting. It is
undisputed that the grievant could not answer those
questions or answer them correctly. As the questions
asked related reasonably to the minimum qualifications
enumerated in the posting, I cannot fault the Company
for deciding that the grievant's inability to respond
correctly
meant
that
he
lacked
the minimum
qualifications for the job.
This is not to say that the grievant could not perform
the job satisfactorily or that he could not learn and
adjust to its requirements and responsibilities in due
time.
Indeed, the grievant struck me as highly
intelligent, poised, stable and well motivated. His
good work record is stipulated. Rather it is to say
that the Company's process of deciding on his
qualifications; the implementation of that process,
and the consideration of his other work experience,
were not irrelevant, unfair or unreasonable, and that
the conclusions reached were not arbitrary, capricious
or discriminatory,
albeit arguably subject
to
different interpretations.
In short, under the instant circumstances; under the
Wirtz formula; and under the presumptions previously
mentioned, this arbitrator finds no legitimate basis
to substitute his judgement for that of the Company.
The coincidence of the foregoing to the facts of the instant
:ase are manifest.
earn the job.

The grievant has a good work record.

Clearly he could

But, under the "Wirtz formula" it is not his potential

.hat equates to "minimum qualifications," but whether he can perform the
ob passably upon assuming it.

Here, as in the 1984 decision, a fair,

•easonable and relevant test was utilized to measure that.
.he 1984 decision, the employee failed the test.

Here, as in

Here, as in the 1984

lecision, the Company's reliance on that test, as determinative in judging

lack

of

ptitude,

minimum qualifications,
was

not

arbitrary,

irrespective

capricious

of

work

record

or discriminatory,

and

and was

.herefore in accord with the well-settled principle and precedent of the
Wirtz formula."

In short, the application of the "Wirtz formula" to the

acts in this case, compelled the end of the grievant's pursuit of the job
>pening with his failure of the written test.
The Undersigned, duly designated as the Arbitrator,

in the

ibove-entitled matter, and having duly heard the proofs and allegations of
.he parties, makes the following AWARD:
The grievant, MAURICE LAVIGNE did not have the minimum
qualifications

required

under

the

provisions

of

Section 1 of Article XXVIII of the National Agreement
or the Local Job Posting and Upgrading Understanding
to be upgraded to the Craft Leader/Planner position in
October 1994.

Eric J. Schmertz, Arbitrator
)ATED:

January 4, 1996

>TATE OF NEW YORK

)

:OUNTY OF NEW YORK

)

ss:

I, Eric J. Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my Oath as Arbitrator
:hat I am the individual described in and who executed this instrument,
/hich is my AWARD.

AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION,
ADMINISTRATOR
-X

IN THE MATTER OF THE ARBITRATION
between
INTERNATIONAL UNION OF ELECTRONIC,
ELECTRICAL, SALARIED, MACHINE AND
FURNITURE WORKERS, AFL-CIO
LOCAL 161

OPINION AND AWARD
CASE # N.D. 113; 991
AAA# 113 0002689-95

and
GENERAL ELECTRIC COMPANY
ROANOKE, VIRGINIA
-X

The stipulated issue is:
Was the termination of JAMES CRAIGHEAD on March 3,
1995 appropriate under the circumstances?

If not,

what shall be the remedy?
A hearing was held in Roanoke, Virginia on March 14, 1996 at
which time Mr. Craighead, hereinafter referred to as the "grievant" and
representatives

of the above-named Union and Company appeared.

All

concerned were afforded full opportunity to offer evidence and argument
and to examine and cross-examine witnesses.

The Arbitrator's Oath was

waived; a stenographic record of the hearing was taken; and the parties
filed post-hearing briefs.
The grievant was terminated under the provisions of
Article VIII Section 2(a)(2) of the National Agreement.

It reads:

Service credits previously accumulated and continuity
of

service,

if

any, will

be

lost

whenever

the

employee....
Is absent from work for more than two (2) consecutive
weeks without satisfactory explanation.

The Company contends that following the taking of vacation time,
some sick leave time and a personal leave day in the month of January
1995, and after exhausting those allowed periods of absence, the grievant
didn't come to work during the month of February; did not contact the
Company during that period; and gave no "satisfactory explanation" for his
continued absence.

Also, he was unreachable.

contact him, it could not do so.

Though the Company tried to

His phone was disconnected and mail to

his last known address was returned.

Only after the grievant called a

fellow employee at the end of February, following which he talked to his
supervisor, did the grievant make contact.

At that point he was advised

by the Company's Human Resources Manager that he was suspended pending
review of his status.

Subsequently he was terminated.

The grievant's explanation for his absence during February was
that he was abusing drugs and was depressed.
The Company asserts that this explanation is not a "satisfactory
explanation" (emphasis added) within the meaning of Article VIII Section
2 (a) (2) of the contract, and not a "satisfactory explanation" as that
contract language has been interpreted by arbitrators in prior arbitration
cases.
more

Hence, argues the Company, the grievant was "absent from work for
than

two

explanation,

(2) consecutive

his termination

weeks"

and, without

was administratively

a

satisfactory

mandated and proper

under the contract.
The Union argues that "drug addiction" is a recognized illness;
that the Company had according it that recognition by the establishment of
an Employee Assistance Program for treatment of drug and alcohol abuse;
that the grievant's long standing addiction to drugs was known to the
Company; that the Company had paid medical benefits for his treatment; and

that therefore his continued addiction and abuse in February should have
been

recognized

and

accepted

by

the

Company

as

a

"satisfactory

explanation" for his absence that month within the meaning and intent of
the foregoing contract provision.
Additionally the Union argues in its brief, but not on an
evidentiary basis at the hearing, that the Company "miscalculated" the
grievant's vacation entitlement.

It reasons that if he had been accorded

the full vacation to which he was entitled for his 25 years of service, it
would have carried him through January and into a substantial part of
February, leaving less than two (2) weeks in February during which he was
otherwise "absent."

And that, therefore, he was not "absent without

satisfactory explanation" for more than two (2) consecutive weeks.
The Union's latter argument must be rejected on procedural
grounds.

Simply put, it was not raised or litigated at the hearing.

It

is a new theory, advanced for the first time in the Union's brief and
therefore not examined in or as part of the necessary adjudicatory process
of the arbitration.

It was not put to the essential evidentiary test. As

such, the Company had no chance to consider it and no opportunity to offer
rebuttal
procedural

evidence

and

argument.

Though

rejected

by me

for these

and due process reasons, I observe, nonetheless, that the

argument is clearly speculative and contrary to the evidentiary record of
what, in fact, the grievant requested and was granted in vacation time.
Accordingly, and factually, I must find that the grievant was
absent in February without permission for more than two (2) weeks; and
that he was not then on vacation or any other approved leave of absence.
The question then is whether he had a "satisfactory explanation" for that
absence.

Article

VIII

Section

2(a)(2)

of

the

contract

has

been

interpreted and applied by arbitrators serving on the contract panel.
It is well-settled that, though not technically res adjudicata,
prior Awards between the same contractual parties under or covered by the
same collective bargaining agreement, which interpret the same contract
language under substantially similar facts, should be accorded credit and
persuasiveness by a subsequent arbitrator unless deemed by that arbitrator
to be "palpably wrong."

Especially so here, in my view, where prior

arbitration decisions were rendered by members of a permanent contract
panel and where one of the purposes of that panel is to make more probable
decisional

predictability,

consistency

and

hence

stability

in

the

application and interpretation of the contract provision in dispute.
In Case #16 300 00283 94 (1995) Arbitrator Joseph P. Sirefman
held that an employee of 27 years was properly terminated under Article
VIII Section 2(a)(2), where the reason for his absence was that he was on
a "drug binge."

Citing a prior Award by Arbitrator Tim Bornstein, where

a woman claimed that her absence was due to headaches and depression,
Sirefman held, as did Bornstein that the employee had the burden of
showing not just that he was ill or abusing drugs, but that he was so
disabled as to be unable to come to work.

Sirefman held that there is a

distinction between "being ill" and "being unable to work or unable to
notify the employer"; and that a "satisfactory explanation" required proof
of the latter as well as the former.
the

influence

of

drugs,"

questions of inability

stated

"General assertions of being under
Sirefman,

to come to work

"do

not

put...to

rest,"

or inability to contact

the

Company.
Substantively, and factually the Sirefman decision is in point
to the instant case before me.

Here the grievant only claims to have been

under the influence of drugs, but admits he received no medical attention.
So, not only is the credibility of his claim in question, but he has not
provided proof or even probative evidence that he was "unable to work or
unable to make contact with the Company."

Indeed, by his own testimony he

admits he did some work during the period to get money to buy drugs.

So,

though I can assume that a "drug binge" can impede one's ability to work,
more than

an assumption

decisions

to

satisfy

is needed under the

the

contractual

Sirefman and

requirement

of

Bornstein

"satisfactory

explanation" for the absence.
In Case# 11 300 01957 89 Arbitrator Theodore J. St. Antoine
sustained the termination of a sixteen-year employee under Article VIII
Section 2 of the contract who absented himself, in part at least, because
of a "cocaine addiction."

He stated "...the evidence in this record would

not support the notion that the grievant's cocaine addiction or illness so
incapacitated him...that it was 'impossible' for him to communicate...with
the Company about his disability."

So, implicit in Section 2(a)(2) and

explicit in Section 2(a)(3) is the requirement that the absent employee
"notify the Company," with the burden on the employee to show he was
unable to do so.

Again, speculatively I can understand an argument that

a cocaine binge could foreclose an ability to notify the Company, but the
prior Awards require proof of that, not speculation.

In the instant case,

the grievant has not met that requirement.
In the previously mentioned decision by Arbitrator Bornstein
(Case #1130-1709-83) he cites the decision of Arbitrator Howard W. Kleeb
(Case #1130-0178-70).

Kleeb upheld a termination under Article VIII

Section 2(a)(2) when the affected employee claimed the absence was due to
"hypertension."

Kleeb found the explanation unsatisfactory because there

was "no evidence that the grievant's doctor told him not to work" or that

he "was bedridden
duties."
employee

or homebound or otherwise unable to perform

normal

So again, the prior decisions place a burden on the affected
to

prove

"inability

to work,"

not

just

an

illness

affliction, or as in the instant case, a "drug addiction."

or an

The grievant

in the instant case has not met that test.
The case cited by the Union, Case #11 E 300 01576 95, decided by
Arbitrator St. Antoine, reversed a discharge which was imposed not under
Article VIII Section 2, but rather under the "four-warnings" disciplinary
policy of the Company.

Also, the discharge was reduced to a suspension,

in part at least, because the affected employee with 16 years service had
a prior unblemished record.
Contrariwise in the instant case, the termination was based on
a different contract provision and on a different contractual theory. And
the grievant before me had an extensive prior disciplinary record for
"absenteeism."

In short, the case cited by the Union in support of its

position is inapposite.
As I have said, I do not find these prior decisions that are
similar to the facts and contract provisions before me, to be "palpably
wrong."

Notwithstanding any contrary views that I may have, I find that

I am persuaded to accept them as precedential.

With that ruling the

Union's argument regarding the "illness nature" of drug addiction, the
Company's recognition of that by its establishment of Employee Assistance
Programs, the Company's knowledge of the grievant's addiction and the
grievant's long service are insufficiently material to overcome the line
of cases upholding the Company's application of Article VIII Section
2(a)(2).
In

other

words,

the

Company's

obligations

and

practices

regarding treatment of an employee for drug addiction do not constitute a

waiver of its contractual right to terminate an employee for an absence
proscribed by Article VIII Section 2, even if that absence is due to drug
abuse.

Any other rule would grant an unlimited immunity to drug use and

to absences due to drug use, and prevent action in cases of where the
employee has failed at rehabilitation.
The Undersigned, duly designated as the Arbitrator in the above
matter, and having duly heard the proofs and allegations of the abovenamed parties, makes the following Award:
The termination of JAMES CRAIGHEAD was appropriate
under the circumstances, and is upheld.

Eric J. Schmertz, Arbitrator
DATED:

JUNE 6, 1996

STATE OF NEW YORK

)

COUNTY OF NEW YORK

)

ss:

I, Eric J. Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my Oath as Impartial
Chairman that I am the individual described in and who executed this
instrument, which is my AWARD.

In the Matter of the Arbitration
- Between LOCAL 74 S.E.I.U

OPINION AND AWARD

and

Case # 13300 80212 96

GODDARD RIVERSIDE COMMUNITY
CENTER — PROJECT REACH OUT
-X

The stipulated issue is:
Is the grievance of MICHAEL GALINDEZ arbitrable?

If

so, was there just cause for his discharge, and if
not, what shall be the remedy?
A hearing was held on May 16, 1996 at which time Mr. Galindez,
hereinafter

referred to as the "grievant" and representatives of the

above-named Union and Employer appeared. All concerned were afforded full
opportunity to offer evidence and argument and to examine and cross
examine witnesses.

The Arbitrator's Oath was waived.

Arbitrability
The grievant was discharged on February 28, 1996.

The Employer

contends that he was still in his probationary period at that time and
that under Article VII Section 1 of the collective bargaining agreement
his discharge may not be protested as a grievance or in arbitration.
contract Section reads:
All employees hired to work at the Agency will serve
a

probationary

period

of

ninety

calendar days from the date of hire.

(90)

continuous

Said

The Agency shall have the right, after consultation
with

a

extend

the

probationary period for an additional ninety

(90)

days.

Union

representative,

A probationary

to

employee's

service may

be

terminated by the Agency at any time, with or without
cause, and the Union will not have recourse to the
grievance

and

arbitration

procedure

over

such

termination. An employee who successfully serves the
probationary period of employment will become a fulltime or regular part-time employee with
computed from the date of hire.

seniority

(Emphasis added)

The grievant was hired as a new employee into the Project Reach
Program on August 28, 1995.

(He served a previous term in a different

program of the Employer and, undisputedly satisfactorily completed the
probationary period in that program).
The
probationary
1996,

Employer

asserts

that the

grievant's

ninety

(90) day

status was extended on November 21, 1995 to February 28,

and that he was terminated on the last day of that extended

probationary period.
The Union contends that the extension of the probationary period
for a second ninety (90) days was improper and ineffective because it was
not

done

"after

consultation

with

a

Union

representative";

that,

therefore, the grievant became a full-time regular employee on or about
November 28, 1995 and his grievance over his discharge is grievable and
arbitrable.

The Employer acknowledges

that the extension was

effectuated

without discussions with a Union representative but asserts that that
requirement is directory and not mandatory in view of the last sentence of
the foregoing contract provision.
"An employee who successfully serves the probationary
period. . .will become a full-time employee. . . " (Emphasis
added)
The Employer argues that because the grievant was determined by
the Employer not to have successfully completed his probationary period,
the failure to consult with the Union when it extended the probationary
period was unnecessary.
The

Employer's

argument

is not

persuasive.

The

contract

explicitly conditions the extension of a probationary period on and after
consultation with the Union.
meaningless

reason,

and

That condition was not negotiated for a

its presence must be

given recognition and

enforcement by the Arbitrator.
Moreover,

if as

a matter

of contract

law, the

grievant's

probationary period ended ninety (90) days after he was hired, namely on
or about November 28, 1995, and he was not terminated then or before then,
it must be contractually deemed that he "successfully
probationary period.

completed" his

The Employer's failure to extend the probationary

period as prescribed by the contract (i.e. after consultation with the
Union) cannot turn or transform a contractually "successful completion" of
the

first

ninety

subsequent period.

(90)

day probationary period

into

an

unsuccessful

Indeed, the Employer acknowledged at the hearing that

no particular notice is given an employee, nor any particular action taken
when an employee successfully completes his probationary period.

If, as

here,

the

extension

of

the

grievant's

probationary

period

was

contractually improper, the Employer's argument that he continued as a
probationary employee and that his work performance during that extended
period was not yet satisfactory, cannot be sustained.
Accordingly, I find that by operation of contract

law, the

grievant completed his probationary period successfully and the grievance
over his discharge is arbitrable.
On the merits, however, the Employer's position is upheld.
The grievant was discharged for two (2) reasons.

The primary

reason was

that his physical presence at work was so offensive and

disturbing

to

other

employees and

to management that his continued

employment could no longer be tolerated.

The other reason was that he had

not demonstrated the requisite skills to effectively work in the Project
Reach Out Program.
The first reason
grievant's

clothing

and

is enough to sustain the discharge.

body

unpleasant disinfectant odor.
eyes of other employees.

give

off

an

intense,

toxic

The

and most

The fumes emanating from him irritate the

Not only did other employees and management

complain about this situation; not only was it repeatedly called to the
grievant's attention; but the fact of the condition was affirmed at the
arbitration hearing.

The Arbitrator experienced the odor emanating from

the grievant, experienced its intensity and unpleasantness and experienced
burning of his eyes.
The grievant admits the use of a strong, toxic disinfectant with
the trade name of "Creolin."

He explains that he trains dogs; that he

uses this solution to clean the kennels; and that the solution is also

used on the dogs' coats.

He claims that he has tried to eliminate the

odor in his body and clothes by cleaning and buying new clothes and by
taking

other

hygienic

steps.

Most significantly for this case, the

grievant asserts that he stopped using the disinfectant in November 1995.
I am not satisfied that the grievant took the steps he could
have taken to eliminate the odor.
counselling

By not doing so, he disregarded the

and pleas of management, and remained insensitive to and

disrespectful of the legitimate objections of his fellow employees.

I

cannot believe that if he stopped using the solution some six (6) months
prior

to the arbitration

hearing, the odor from him would still be

present, and certainly not at the current intensity.

Moreover, the bottle

of Creolin he produced at the hearing he admits he bought only a day
before the hearing.

If in fact he discontinued its use in November, why

did he buy more of it so recently.

I must conclude that despite expressed

concern to him by management and more explicit warnings, he did not
discontinue

the use

of the

disinfectant and did

not take

steps to

eliminate or reduce to acceptable levels the odors resulting therefrom.
His failure to do so means to me that he has been more interested in his
dog training business than his job with the Employer, and has remained
indifferent to the way he is unreasonably disturbing the work environment
of the other employees.
It is well-settled that a condition of this type, which makes
the physical presence of an employee intolerable to others and which, as
here, is intensively disturbing to the work environment, is grounds for
termination of the offending employee, especially where, as here, he has
failed to take steps to eliminate the offense.

The Undersigned duly designated as the Arbitrator, and having
duly heard the proofs and allegations of the above-named parties, makes
the following AWARD:
The grievance of MICHAEL GALINDEZ is arbitrable.
The discharge of MICHAEL GALINDEZ was for just cause.

Eric J. Schmertz, Arbitrator

DATED:

May 29, 1996

STATE OF NEW YORK

)
ss:

COUNTY OF NEW YORK

)

I, Eric J. Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my Oath as Arbitrator
that I am the individual described in and who executed this instrument,
which is my AWARD.

OFFICE OF IMPARTIAL ARBITRATOR
IN THE MATTER OF THE ARBITRATION
between
IRON WORKERS LOCAL 580; IRON WORKERS
,OCAL 580 EMPLOYEE BENEFIT FUNDS

OPINION AND AWARD

-andJAGLER INDUSTRIES

The stipulated issue is:
1.

Is the grievance arbitrable?

2.

If so, was the Employer's termination of steward DENNIS
MORA in violation of the Collective Bargaining Agreement?
If so, what shall be the remedy?

Hearings were held at the Hofstra Law School on June 26 and
August 7, 1996 at which time Mr. Mora, hereinafter
'grievant" and representatives
appeared.

referred

to as the

of the above-named Union and Employer

All concerned were afforded full opportunity to offer evidence

and argument and to examine and cross-examine witnesses. The Arbitrator's
Oath was waived.

The parties filed post-hearing

briefs.

Arbitrability
The Employer

contends

that the grievance

is not

arbitrable

because neither the grievant nor the Union followed or complied with the
various procedural steps of the grievance procedure and failed to submit
the grievance to arbitration within the mandatorily prescribed time limits
thereof.

Accordingly, the Employer asserts that the "matter," namely the

Union's protest of the discharge of the grievant, "shall be dropped."

In pertinent

part Article XXL Grievance and/or Arbitration

Procedures, reads:

(a) Any grievance, complaint, or dispute between the Union and
the Employer arising out of this Agreement, or as to the
meaning, interpretation, application or alleged violation
of any provision or provisions of this Agreement shall be
handled in the first instance by an officer of the Union
designated

by

the

Union

and

a representative

of the

Employer involved who is a member of the Association.
(b)

If the representatives of the Union and the Employer fail
to reach an agreement within

five

(5) work

days, the

grievance, complaint, or dispute shall be handled by a
designee or designees of the Union and the Association.
The designee of Allied shall be a member of the Association
or a permanent employee of the Association.
The

aggrieved

party

shall

file

a

statement

of

the

grievance, complaint, or dispute with the Association or
the Union, as the case may be.
The designees shall meet within (2) work days after the
receipt of written notification.
(c)

If the designees of the Union and the Association fail to
reach agreement within three (3) work days after they meet,
as provided above, the grievance, complaint, or dispute
shall be submitted

for final and binding

to...the Impartial Arbitrator.
Impartial Arbitrator

determination

If for any reason the

is incapacitated or for any other

reason is unable to act expeditiously, he shall designate

a substitute Arbitrator.

If the Impartial Arbitrator is

unable to make such designation, the Union and the Allied
Association shall promptly make such designation.
they

fail

to

agree

on

a

Should

substitute Arbitrator,

the

procedures of the American Arbitration Association, shall
be utilized to resolve these disputes on a case by case
basis until the Union and the Allied Association agree on
a permanent Arbitrator.
The Impartial Arbitrator shall have all the powers granted
to arbitrators pursuant to the Civil Practice Law and Rules
of

Procedure

of the

State

of New

York

and

shall

be

authorized to compel the production of books and records of
any kind or type which may be involved in a dispute.

The

decision of the Impartial Arbitrator shall be final and
binding on the Employer and the Union.
(d)

If the party initiating the grievance, complaint or dispute
fails to submit the matter to the Impartial

Arbitrator

within ten (10) work days after the designee of the Union
and the Employer are unable to reach agreement, the matter
shall be dropped.
The Union does not dispute the Employer's assertion that it did
not invoke the foregoing steps of the grievance procedure.

Nor does it

contend that the grievance was submitted to arbitration within the "ten
(10) work days" prescribed in (d) above.
Rather, it is the Union's position that it was not required to
initiate the grievance procedure because those steps should have been

taken first by the Employer.

Specifically in this regard, the Union

relies on Section XIV of the Contract which, in pertinent part states:
(a)

A steward shall be appointed by the Union.
shall

not

be

laid

off

or discharged

or

Such steward
discriminated

against for performing his duties as a steward, unless such
layoff or discharge is sanctioned in accordance with the
grievance and arbitration procedure hereinafter provided
for in Section XXL.
It argues that because the grievant was a steward, his discharge
was procedurally defective

at the threshold because it was not first

"sanctioned" by the grievance and arbitration provisions of the Contract.
And hence, it was the Employer's obligation, not that of the grievant or
the

Union,

to

initiate

the

grievance procedure

and

arbitration

to

"sanction" its action.
The Union also relies on the

"20 day notice" provision of

Article 7503, Civil Practice Law and Rules.

The Union served that notice

on the Employer along with its demand for arbitration to the Impartial
Arbitrator.

It cites the statutory language that precludes the Employer

"from objecting

that a valid agreement was not made or has not been

complied with... "upon the failure of the Employer to move to stay the
arbitration

after service of the 20 day notice, and argues that the

Employer is therefore foreclosed from claiming in this arbitration that
the Union did not comply with the steps of the grievance procedure or any
time limit thereof.
raise

the

issue

Also, the Union contends that for the Employer not to

of

non-arbitrability

constituted a waiver of that defense.

until

the

arbitration

hearing

On the issue of arbitrability, the facts are not in dispute.
The grievant was the Union's steward.
1995.

He was discharged on November 3,

The Union's first formal protest of the discharge was a letter to

the Undersigned from Union counsel dated December 7, 1995, demanding
arbitration.

The first formal notice to the Employer of the Union's

demand for arbitration was a subsequent letter to the parties from the
Undersigned scheduling a hearing.
It is also undisputed that the parties are in disagreement over
the reasons for the grievant's discharge.

The Union claims that he was

fired because and as a conseguence of his engagement in statutorily
•protected" union activity.

The Employer contends that the discharge was

solely because of the grievant's poor productivity on his bargaining unit
job, his unauthorized absence from his work locations, and his failure to
carry out the duties of his job classification.
I conclude that the grievance must be deemed as "dropped" within
the meaning of Paragraph (d) above and that it is not arbitrable on the
merits.
Article XIV does not foreclose the discharge of an employee who
also happens to be a Union steward before "sanctioned" by the contractual
grievance and arbitration provisions.

It prohibits the discharge of a

steward for performing his duties as a steward, until and unless so
sanctioned.

Here the parties are in critical dispute over whether the

grievant was discharged for performing his duties as a steward or because
his work as an employee was unsatisfactory.

That threshold dispute is in

and of itself a factual disagreement that takes the issue out of the
restrictions of Article XIV and makes it, along with the issue of cause
for the grievant's discharge, subject to review in and under the regular
grievance and arbitration provision of the Contract.

In short, with the

presence of that threshold dispute, I do not find that Section XIV barred
the Employer from discharging the grievant as an employee, subject of
course to review subsequently of all the reasons for the discharge in the
grievance and arbitration provisions of the Contract.

As the Employees

reasons for the discharge and its theory of the case are not based on the
grievant's status or duties as a steward, the Employer was not obligated
-o

initiate

the

grievance and

arbitration provisions

precedent to effectuating the discharge.

as

conditions

Rather, if at that point, the

Union believed that Article XIV was violated because the discharge was for
"protected activity" that belief constituted a grievable issue.

And the

Union had the right and the duty at that point, to grieve its objection
and its interpretation of Article XIV.
Employer's

reason

It did not do so.

for the discharge were other

Indeed, if the

than because of his

activities as a Steward, how could the Employer initiate an Article XIV
proceeding, which by its terms relates to a discharge for performance of
steward duties?
As

is

uncontested,

the

Union

sequential steps of the grievance procedure.
within ten

did

not

invoke

any

of

the

It filed for arbitration not

(10) work days of what would have been the point that the

designees of the parties (under (d)) were "unable to reach an agreement,"
but not until December 7, 1995, some 34 days later.
As a discharge case, with a disputed issue over whether the
grievant was discharged as an employee or for performing his duties as a
steward, the burden was on the Union to initiate and process its grievance
over

the

discharge

through

the

grievance steps

arbitration within the ten (10) work days prescribed.

and

thereafter

to

That the contract

provides that the grievance "shall be dropped" (emphasis added) if the ten

'10) work day time limit is not followed, means, of course, that that time
.imit is mandatory and a "statute of limitation."
The Arbitrator need not remind the parties that they, not he,
negotiated the grievance and arbitration provisions of the contract, with
.ts mandatory

time

limit.

And

it

is to

enforcement that the Arbitrator is bound.

the

contract

and

to

its

That the Union unilaterally

thought that resort to the grievance procedure would be "futile" is not an
excuse to by-pass it without mutual agreement to do so.
The

Employer's

"participation"

in

the

selection

of

the

Arbitrator and in the arbitration proceeding, does not constitute a waiver
of its non-arbitrability defense.

"Participation" constitutes a waiver of

that defense only in a court proceeding for a stay or for a motion in
ourt to vacate an Award.
The

Union's

argument

that

the

Employer

waived

the

non-

arbitrability defense because it did not raise it until the arbitration
hearing also is not good law.

It is well-settled that the defense of non-

arbitrability need not be advanced in the grievance procedure or earlier
than at the arbitration forum, but can be raised effectively for the first
time in the forum in which it is applicable, namely in the arbitration
forum.

Also, in this case, as the Employer did not know of the grievance

until it was filed for arbitration, it had no opportunity or forum any
earlier to assert the defense of non-arbitrability.
Finally, the Union's reliance on the statutory "20 day notice"
is unavailing as a matter of law.

It is settled law that the "20 day notice" under Article 7503 of
:he Civil Practice Laws and Rules does not have the same effect in labor
arbitration as it does in commercial arbitration.

In fact, the "20 day

notice" in a labor case does not oust the arbitrator from considering and
ruling

on procedural

arbitrability issues

respondent) does not stay the arbitration.
Employer

even if the

Employer (or

Indeed, whether or not the

seeks a stay, the issue of procedural arbitrability remains

within the jurisdiction and responsibility of the arbitrator and will be
referred to him by the court even if a stay of arbitration is sought.

In

short, unlike a commercial arbitration, the service of a 20 day notice
neither prevents the Employer from claiming procedural non-arbitrability
in the arbitration, nor does it divest or release the arbitrator from the
authority or duty to decide that issue.
The Commentary on Article 7503 in McKinney's Consolidated Laws
of New York reads:
While most of the rules governing labor arbitration are the same
as

those

in commercial

difference.

arbitration,

there

is one

salient

Because of the national public policy which applies

to collective bargaining agreements, there is a presumption of
arbitrability in labor disputes.

That presumption extends even

to the root issue as to who must decide whether there is an
arbitrable question.

So long as there is some question, whether

that question be substantive or procedural,

it is for the

arbitrators to decide whether the issues should be submitted to
arbitration

or left for common-law litigation.

The court's

function is limited to finding that a dispute of some kind does
in fact exist.

If the parties to a collective bargaining

agreement

to escape

desire

8

this presumption, then

express

language should be carefully drafted providing that questions as
to whether a matter is arbitrable are for the courts. Matter of
the Arbitration between Long Island Lumber Co., Inc. and Martin.
1965, 15 N.Y. 2d 380, 259 N.Y.S. 2d 142, 207 N.E.2d 190.
Here the parties have not included express language in their
contract

giving

arbitrability.

the

courts

the

authority

to

decide

procedural

So, under 7503, even in the face of a 20 day notice and

the failure of the Employer to seek a stay of the arbitration, the court
will

not

decide

arbitrator.

procedural

arbitrability,

but

leave

that

to

the

So, it is not the effect or consequence of the 20 day notice

to foreclose the Employer from asserting non-arbitrability

(i.e. the

Union's failure to comply with the contract) as a defense, and it remains
the original duty of the arbitrator to decide that issue.
Consider the landmark case of Vincent J. Smith Inc. v. Truck
Drivers and Helpers Local Union No. 640 1965, 23 A.D. 2d 944, 259 N.Y.S.
2d 888:
Under

contract,

between

employer

and

labor

union,

for

arbitration of grievances including "any controversy, complaint,
misunderstanding, or dispute * * *", employer's objections,
urged as grounds for stay of arbitration proceedings, that labor
union

had

not

complied with

provision

requiring

initial

settlement discussion or with provisions considered by employer
to be time limitations, and certain other objections were for
arbitrator's

determination,

and stay was

properly refused.

Vincent J. Smith, Inc. v. Truck Drivers and Helpers Local Union
No. 649, 1965, 23 A.D. 2d 944, 259 N.Y.S. 2d 888.

The facts in that case are the same as the instant matter.

The

holding makes clear that even if the Employer here sought a stay of the
arbitration after being served with a 20 day notice, the court would not
determine the procedural arbitrability dispute but rather would deny the
stay and refer the arbitrability issue(s) to the Arbitrator.

That being

so, it cannot be persuasively argued by the Union in this case that the
Employer's failure to move to stay this arbitration foreclosed him from
asserting his procedural non-arbitrability defense before the Arbitrator.
If, as held, procedural arbitrability issues are for the Arbitrator, and
so recognized by the courts, the service of a 20 day notice is essentially
ineffective in depriving the Employer of that defense in arbitration.
(Though it may deprive him of that defense in a court proceeding on the
merits).
Moreover, the foregoing notwithstanding, I fail to see how the
mere service

of a 20 day notice after total non-compliance with the

grievance procedures

and its time limits to go to arbitration

should serve to cure that defect.

can or

At least, if the 20 day notice is to

lave any effectiveness, the Union should be able to assert and show a
arima facie compliance with the procedural steps its notice seeks to
foreclose the Employer from contesting.
Considering
Arbitrator

to

uphold

The Union cannot show that here.

all the foregoing and especially the duty of the
and

enforce

the

contract

which

the

parties

negotiated, I find that the grievant and the Union did not comply with the
grievance steps of the contract, did not comply with the mandatory time
limits

thereof,

initiative

in

and had
order

to

a contractual obligation to do so on their
protest

the

Employer's

arbitration of the instant grievance on the merits.

10

action

and

to

gain

Accordingly, the Undersigned, Impartial Arbitrator under the
Collective

Bargaining

Agreement

between

the above-named

parties, and

laving duly heard the proofs and allegations of said parties make the
ollowing AWARD:
The grievance of DENNIS MORA is not arbitrable.

Eric J. Schmertz, Impartial Arbitrator

DATED:

September 20, 1996

TATE OF NEW YORK

)

COUNTY OF NEW YORK

)

ss:
I, Eric J. Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my Oath as Impartial
Arbitrator that I am the individual described in and who executed this
instrument, which is my AWARD.
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AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION
ADMINISTRATOR
In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
,OCAL 707, IBT
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-and-

VLAGAZINE DISTRIBUTORS, INC.
-x

The stipulated issue is:
Did the Employer violate Article 9 Section 3 of the
Collective
night

Bargaining Agreement by failing to pay

differential

employees,

Bonus

namely RALPH

to

the

Driver/Check-in

RAMOS, OMAR QUIROZ, JEFF

GILROY and one other, within the period of time June
1994 to the present?
A

hearing

was

If so, what shall be the remedy?

held

on

September

20,

1996

at

which

time

representatives of the above-named Union and Employer appeared and were
afforded full opportunity to offer evidence and argument and to examine
and cross-examine witnesses.

The Arbitrator's Oath was waived.

The pertinent contract provision, Article 9 Section 3 reads:
The practice of continuing a 10% night differential "Bonus" for
straight time hours only, (worked between 6:00 P.M. and 4:00
A.M.)

will

continue

Bargaining Agreement.

for

the

duration

of

the

Collective

It is the Union's contention that the employees classified as
Drivers/Check-in whose regular work schedule since June 1994 has been from
10:30 A.M.

to 8:30 P.M.

(except for grievant Quiroz, whose regular

schedule is from 12 Noon to 10:00 P.M. on Monday and Tuesday, and 11:00
A.M. to 9:00 P.M. on Wednesdays and Thursdays) should have received the
10% night differential "Bonus" for the hours worked after 6:00 P.M.
The

question

of

timeliness

of

the

grievance

and

its

arbitrability notwithstanding, the evidence conclusively establishes that
the Employer and officials of the prior administration of the Union agreed
at contract negotiations in 1994 that the foregoing contract provision
would apply only to a shift then in existence which began at 6:00 P.M.
(and has since been discontinued) and to the night loaders.

Of course,

what was agreed to by prior Union officials, remains binding on the Union
today.
The Employer's unrefuted testimony regarding what was discussed
when Article 9 Section 3 was negotiated was that the Union understood and
agreed that that provision would not apply to any employee who did not
oegin his work shift on or after 6:00 P.M.

And that hence, it was

understood that the Drivers/Check-in were excluded.
Also unrefuted is the Employer's testimony that at the urging of
the present Union leadership, an exception was made subsequently for about
four to six weeks for employees classified as Scanners who were shifted
from the day shift to night hours during the installation of automated
systems.

But that agreement to accommodate the Scanners was expressly

without prejudice to the Company's position that Article 9 Section 3 did
not apply to Drivers/Check-in, and that if Drivers/Check-in sought the
night differential during that four to six week period, they would not
receive it.

The Employer asserts that the Union representative gave

assurances that that was understood and "would be so explained to the
Drivers/Check-in."
Evidence that

Additionally, and also unrefuted is testimony and

since 1994, Article 9 Section 3 has been applied and

Implemented consistent with the Employer's view of its meaning.

With the

Bxception of the four to six week period of accommodation for Scanners,
vhose work schedules were markedly disrupted by temporary transfers to
light work, no employee who began work before 6:00 P.M. and worked
thereafter received the night differential.

And at no time since 1994

Article 9 Section 3 was negotiated did any Drivers/Check-in receive
the Bonus for hours he worked after 6:00 P.M.

This unvaried practice

affirms the Employer's interpretation of the contract.
Based on the foregoing, I am compelled to conclude that by
nutual agreement and practice, Drivers/Check-in were not and are not
antitled to the night differential "Bonus" set forth in Article 9 Section
3 of the contract.
The Undersigned, duly designated as the Arbitrator, and having
iuly heard the proofs and allegations of the above-named parties, makes
the following AWARD:
The

Employer

did

not violate Article 9 Section

3 of the

Collective Bargaining Agreement by not paying Drivers/Check-in
employees a night differential "Bonus" for any period from June
1994 to the present.

Eric J. Schmertz, Arbitrator

DATED:

September 24, 1996

STATE OF NEW YORK

)

COUNTY OF NEW YORK

)

ss:

I, Eric J. Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my Oath as Arbitrator
that I am the individual described in and who executed this instrument,
is my AWARD.

.^PARTIAL CHAIRMAN, LOCAL 100 TWUA -andNEW YORK BUS SERVICE
IN THE MATTER OF THE ARBITRATION
between
OPINION AND AWARD
LOCAL 100 TRANSPORT WORKERS UNION
OF AMERICA

(SALVATORE FUSCO)

-andNEW YORK BUS SERVICE
-X

The stipulated issue is:
Has the Company violated Article 33 of the Collective
Bargaining

Agreement

by

requiring

bus

operator,

SALVATORE FUSCO to submit to a drug and alcohol test,
complete a DMV 104 form and/or return to work prior to
the test results, as the result of an incident which
occurred on his school bus route on October 3, 1996?
If not, what shall be the remedy?
A hearing was held at the Hofstra University School of Law on
December 5, 1996 at which time Mr. Fusco, hereinafter referred to as the
"grievant" and representatives

of the above-named Union and Company

appeared.
All concerned were afforded full opportunity to offer evidence
and argument and to examine and cross-examine witnesses.
Oath was waived.

The Arbitrator's

The facts

surrounding

the incident which gave rise to the

Company's requirement that the grievant take a drug and alcohol test and
fill out a DMV 104 form, are not in dispute.
dispute
grievant

Significantly, also not in

is the Company's acknowledgement that in no respect was the
at fault and in no regard

did the grievant

act wrongly or

negligently in connection with that incident.
The grievant, a school bus operator, operated his bus properly
on October 3, 1996, the day of the incident.
to discharge
flashing

student

passengers.

He properly stopped his bus

He properly

activated

lights on the bus signifying his approaching

stop, and then

activated the flashing red lights upon and during the stop.
descended from the bus in an orderly and correct manner.

the yellow

The students

One, the student

that was ultimately injured, left the bus and got on to the sidewalk. But
instead of turning right, as was his procedure to go to an after school
activity, he turned left, and went to the crosswalk ahead of the bus.
Then, as witnessed by the crossing guard who testified, he started across
the street against a red light.

As he crossed, he was struck by an

automobile that passed the stopped bus from behind on the outside lane.
The automobile failed to stop behind the bus, apparently disregarding the
flashing lights.

The student who was struck was injured and was taken by

ambulance to the hospital.
Again, undisputedly, there was nothing that the grievant did or
failed to do that had any proximate or causal connection to what happened
to the injured student.

The grievant was, as an attending police officer

stated, only a witness to the accident.

Yet the Company required the grievant to undergo a drug and
alcohol test by testing his breath with a breathometer and by taking and
thereafter testing
alcohol use.

his urine.

Both tests were negative for drug or

He was also required to fill out a DMV 104 form describing

the accident, and he did so under protest.
The Union protests both.

It asserts that

in view of the

acknowledgement that the grievant was blameless, there were no reasonable
grounds to require either; that both should be fully expunged from the
grievant's personnel record and removed from any source to which they were
reported

(e.g. the Board of Education, the Department of Motor Vehicle,

the Department of Transportation).

And that because the test for drugs

and alcohol was without reasonable cause and did not follow the procedural
requirements of Article 33 of the contract, the grievant should be granted
extra compensation for the period of time from taking the test to the
issuance

of its official results, in addition to the regular pay he

received for that period.
The Company responds that this is not an Article 33 case; that
the administration of a drug and alcohol test and the filling out of a DMV
104 form are mandated by certain regulations of the Board of Education and
the Motor Vehicle law and that the Company is legally and contractually
bound to both.
Additionally, the Company asserts that both requirements were
reasonable exercises of its managerial authority under the contractual
management rights clause and that both were required not just to comply
with the law and Board of Education regulations but were protective of the
grievant as well as the Company in any subsequent lawsuit against either
or both.

I conclude that the Company, operating the bus in question under
contract with the Board of Education and transporting students, is bound
to both the rules and regulations of the Department of Transportation and
Federal

Highway

Administration

and

Title

17

Chapter

6

of

the

Administrative Code of New York City and to relevant provisions of the
Motor Vehicle law.

But I also conclude that those rules and regulations

and the law must be interpreted and invoked under "a rule of reason"
reflective of the particular circumstances of the incident or accident
involved.
Both sides introduced into evidence written

statements from

officials of the Board of Education and the Department of Motor Vehicles
purporting to authoritatively inform the Arbitrator whether or not, under
the facts of this case, a test of the bus operator for alcohol or drugs
and the requirement that he fill out a DMV 104 form were proper and
mandated.

However, those documents were unsupported by direct testimony

and were not subject to the credibility test of cross-examination.
they are inconsistent.

Also

As such, I must deem them non-determinative and

probatively inconclusive.
However, I accept and take arbitral notice as applicable and
relevant, Title 17 Chapter 6 of the Administrative Code of the City of New
York and certain provision of the New York State Motor Vehicle law.
The latter requires that a DMV 104 form be filled out by the
operator of the bus and filed with the DMV, SEP, DOT and with the office
of Pupil Transportation of the Board of Education "within ten (10) days of
an accident."

(emphasis added)
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The former requires a "post accident" drug test to any bus
driver who during the course of his/her employment:
1.

"is involved in a serious accident while
operating a bus or other motor vehicle.

(A

serious accident is defined as an accident
associated with the operation of a bus or
motor

vehicle

used

to

transport

school

children in which an individual...must be
taken to a medical treatment facility..."
(emphasis added).
The obvious questions in this case are whether the incident was
"an accident" within the meaning of the Motor Vehicle law and/or "an
accident associated with the operation of a bus...."(emphasis added).
Let me deal with the drug and alcohol test first.

A rule of

reason, in my judgement, would affirm any such test if the physical and
mental condition of the bus operator had any reasonable, proximate or
causal connection to the accident involved.

In other words, a drug and

alcohol test would be appropriate, indeed mandated, if the operator's
physical condition or impairment due to drug or alcohol use was in any way
"associated"
operation

with

the

accident

or

in

anyway

"associated"

of the bus where there is causal relationship

operation of the bus and the accident.

with

the

between the

In my judgement that is what the

foregoing law intends and means.
But, here, the grievant's condition was in no way related to or
"associated" either with the incident or with the operation of the bus.

Put another way, assuming arguendo that the test for alcohol and drugs was
positive, that condition still would have had no causal or proximate
connection to the incident.

The student would have been struck by the on

coming car and injured regardless of the bus operator's condition and
whether

or not the operator

was impaired by alcohol or drugs.

The

grievant's condition and his operation of the bus had nothing to do with
the injury to the student, and hence both are irrelevant to what happened.
So, in short, I find no reasonable grounds to have required the
grievant to undergo an alcohol and drug test.
ompany's

argument

that

the

drug

or alcohol

While I appreciate the
test was,

in part, a

protection for the grievant, I must conclude that is was not proper and
cannot be upheld if it was not required by the meaning and intent of the
foregoing Administrative Code.
namely

irrelevance,

Nor I might add and for the same reason,

I find no basis to sustain

the test

under the

Management Rights Clause.
Accordingly,

I shall direct the test,

its results

and any

reference to it be annulled and expunged for the grievant's personnel
records.

The Company shall inform the Board of Education and any other

agency which received reports of it that it has been deemed by arbitration
to be a nullity.
With the annulment of the drug and alcohol test and with the
attendant legal effect that it never took place, I find it unnecessary to
rule on the Union's claim that it did not follow the prescriptions of
Article 33.

Nor need I deal with or rule on the Union's requested remedy

that the grievant receive additional compensation of any period of time he
worked between taking the test and the issuance of its results.

However, applying

the same "rule of reason" results in a

different conclusion regarding the DMV 104 form.

Irrespective of

the

Motor Vehicle law and without the need to decide whether the incident was
an "accident" within its meaning, I conclude that the requirement that the
grievant fill out a DMV 104 form was a proper exercise of the Company's
managerial authority.

I accept and agree with the Company's assertion

that the DMV 104 was required and designed to provide information about
the incident virtually contemporaneous with its occurrence, and that as
such, it was needed for factual information and as a protection for the
Company and the grievant against any liability suit.

But I deem the DMV

104 form, filled out by the grievant and filed with the Board of Education
and other agencies to be a statement from a witness to the incident and
not a statement from a participant in the incident or accident or as one
involved in the accident.

The records of the Company and those of the

agencies with which the DMV 104 form was filed should reflect that limited
role by the grievant.

This Award may be deemed to serve that purpose.

Also, a word to distinguish my ruling on the alcohol and drug
test from the DMV 104 form. The alcohol and drug test I deemed irrelevant
to the incident or accident.

But the report and recollections of the

grievant as a witness to the incident or accident are relevant to a full
understanding of what happened.
affirmation of the latter.

Hence, my rejection of the former and my

The

Undersigned,

Impartial

Chairman

under

the

Collective

Bargaining Agreement between the above-named parties and having duly heard
the proofs and allegations of said parties, makes the following AWARD:
1.

The drug and alcohol test administered to
bus operator SALVATORE FUSCO is voided and
nullified.

As

annulled,

it

shall

be

expunged from his records and notification
of its annulment and expungement shall be
given

by

the

Company

to

the

Board

of

Education and other agencies with which the
drug and alcohol test and report was filed.
2.

The requirement that Mr. Fusco fill out an
DMV 104 form is upheld.

But his role in

doing so is and was as a witness to the
incident

or

participant

accident
in

or

as

and

not

involved

as
in

a
the

incident or accident.

Eric J./Schmertz
Impartial Chairman
DATED:

December 31, 1996

STATE OF NEW YORK
COUNTY OF NEW YORK

)
ss:
)

I, Eric J. Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my Oath as Impartial
Chairman that I am the individual described in and who executed this
instrument, which is my AWARD.
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IMPARTIAL CHAIRMAN LOCAL 100 TRANSPORT
WORKERS UNION -AND- NEW YORK BUS SERVICE
x

IN THE MATTER OF THE ARBITRATION
between
LOCAL 100, TRANSPORT WORKERS UNION
OF AMERICA

OPINION AND AWARD

and
NEW YORK BUS SERVICE

The stipulated issue is:
Was there just cause for the discharge of ELIZABETH
GOMEZ?

If not, what shall be the remedy?

A hearing was held on May 8, 1996 at which time Ms. Gomez,
hereinafter

referred

to as the "grievant" and representatives

of the

above-named Union and Company appeared. All concerned were afforded full
opportunity to offer evidence and argument and to examine and crossexamine witnesses.

The Arbitrator's Oath was waived.

Against the back drop of her involvement in several chargeable
accidents for which she was progressively disciplined, the grievant is
charged with responsibility for another "chargeable" accident on March 8,
1996 when the bus she was operating hit a tree located just outside the
curb of the road.

No passengers were on the bus at the time.

suffered some damage to the upper right side of its chassis.

The bus
This last

accident triggered the grievant's discharge as the final step in the
progressive discipline process.
Whether

the grievant's involvement in accidents before the

accident of March 8 constituted grounds for her dismissal, is not the
issue.

The Company did not discharge her for those prior accidents on at

the time of their accumulation, so that question is not before me.

Rather, in this case it is acknowledged that but for the March 8 accident
the grievant would not have been discharged.
event that triggered

The final accident was the

the discharge because, in the judgement of the

Company, it was "chargeable" or in other words due to the grievant's
negligence or unsafe driving.
It follows that based on that theory of this case, if the
"chargeability" of that last accident has not been established, it would
fail as the trigger for the discharge penalty and the grievant's discharge
should be reversed even if her prior accident record justified dismissal.
The burden of that proof is on the Company, I find that it has not been
met.
It is undisputed that at the time of the accident the road was
snow covered and icy.

The grievant testified that because of the poor

driving conditions she had slowed to about 15 miles per hour.

She stated

that when she attempted to make a normal stop behind a car ahead, which
had stopped for a red light, the bus skidded, slid into the curb and made
contact with the tree.

There were no other witnesses at the accident.

There is no evidence that the grievant's testimony about how fast she was
travelling was false.

There is no evidence that the road conditions were

not as she testified.

And most significantly, there is no evidence that

such a skid, on snow and ice, would not have occurred unless the grievant
was driving faster than 15 miles per hour or travelling too close to the
car ahead.
In the absence of any contravailing evidence I do not consider
it unreasonable or unrealistic to conclude that such a skid was possible

even at the slow speed the grievant asserts she was driving, even if she
was following the car ahead by an adequately safe distance and even if she
applied the brakes normally at a proper distance behind the car ahead in
anticipation or in response to the red light at the intersection.
Of

course,

it

is equally possible

that

the

grievant

was

travelling too fast and had not maintained a sufficient distance behind
the car ahead.

But the evidence presented by the Company, limited to the

fact that her bus hit a tree, is not enough to prove those assertions.
Her statement at her hearing that the "light caught the car
ahead by surprise" can be interpreted two ways.

It could mean that she

had to stop more quickly than expected and had not properly anticipated
the need to do so.

But, it could also be simply an observation of why she

stopped when she did.

Considering the burden of proof in this matter I am

not persuaded that her statement is enough to prove that she was at fault
either because of the speed of the bus or the distance between it and the
car ahead, or otherwise.

In short, the accident may have been because of

the snow and ice and for no other reason.
That many of the Company's buses travelled the same route that
day and about at the same general time without accidents is not convincing
evidence that the grievant's accident had to be her fault.

There is no

evidence that the other buses applied their brakes at the point the
grievant did and I deem it speculative to reason that the location at
which the grievant applied the brakes was not different as to the quantity
or texture of the snow and ice than at any other location on that road.
Absent more direct or probative evidence about the accident I
cannot conclude that the conditions at the accident location were the same
for the other Company buses travelling that day on that road or that the

conditions confronting the grievant add up, probatively, to negligence or
fault on her part within the meaning of "chargeability."
This is not to say that the grievant did not drive unsafely

but

rather that the requisite evidence does not prove it. Based on the record
before me, it is too much of an evidentiary stretch to reach any such
conclusion.
With this finding that the accident was not proved as chargeable
the "trigger" reason

for the grievant's discharge has failed and the

discharge must be reversed.
However, companion to my several prior decisions in which I have
repeatedly held that the Company has a fiduciary duty to the public to
operate safely; that its drivers have a similar duty to drive prudently
and safely; that the Company need not await a major accident before it can
discharge a driver who incurs more than a reasonable number of accidents
(rulings which I reiterated herein), I also recognize the condition of
"accident proneness."
I

have

held

and

reiterate

herein

that

a

driver

whose

accumulation of accidents, regardless of severity and chargeability, may
be disciplined and discharged as proper preventative steps in compliance
with the Company's fiduciary duty on the ground of "accident proneness."
The grievant

is just about at that point.

Because she was

discharged for a final chargeable accident, I will not, at this time,
sustain the discharge on the different ground of accident proneness.

But,

she is expressly warned that she is at or virtually at the point of being
so identified and could be so judged in the future in the event of a
further accident, regardless of chargeability.
deny her request for back pay.

For that reason, I shall

Instead, though I shall direct her

reinstatement, the period from her discharge to her reinstatement shall be

deemed a disciplinary

suspension for her quantity of accidents and to

impress on her the precariousness of her tenure.

In short, I shall give

tier one final chance to drive safely and accident free.
The

Undersigned,

bargaining agreement

Impartial

Chairman

under

the

collective

between the above-named parties, and having duly

heard the proofs and allegations of said parties, makes the following
AWARD:
The discharge
suspension.
pay.

of ELIZABETH GOMEZ is reduced to a

She shall be reinstated but without back

She is expressly warned that her involvement in

future accident(s), regardless of chargeability, will
result in the judgement that she is accident prone and
make her subject to discharge.

Eric J. Schmertz
Impartial Chairman
DATED:

May 23, 1996

STATE OF NEW YORK
COUNTY OF NEW YORK

)
ss:
)

I, Eric J. Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my Oath as Impartial
Chairman that I am the individual described in and who executed this
instrument, which is my AWARD.

AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION,
ADMINISTRATOR
-X

IN THE MATTER OF THE ARBITRATION
between
1199 NATIONAL HEALTH AND HUMAN
SERVICES EMPLOYEES UNION

OPINION AND AWARD
Case #133000075995

-andNEW YORK COMMUNITY HOSPITAL OF
BROOKLYN, INC.
-X

The stipulated issue is:
Was there just cause for the discharge of EMILIO
NAVARRO?

If not, what shall be the remedy?

A hearing was held on November 20, 1995 at which time Mr.
Navarro, hereinafter referred to as the "grievant" and representatives of
the above-named Union and Hospital appeared.

All concerned were afforded

full opportunity to offer evidence and argument and to examine and crossexamine witnesses. The Arbitrator's Oath was waived and the parties filed
post-hearing briefs.
Prior to his discharge the grievant was a Transporter whose
primary duty was to transport patients among the facilities and treatment
centers of the Hospital.
He was discharged

for what the Hospital asserts

were four

incidents of "insubordination" and "inappropriate behavior" during the
week of April 10, 1995.

Those incidents separately or in combination, are

viewed by the Hospital as cause for discharge, especially when considered
against the back drop of the grievant's prior disciplinary record.

That

record is made up of a number of verbal and written warnings and two
suspensions, all for acts of "insubordination and inappropriate conduct."

The Hospital
objected to, resisted

asserts

that on April

10, 1995 the grievant

and delayed in reporting for clerical "cross-

training" and engaged his supervisor, Raji Mathai in an argument over the
assignment.
It asserts that on April llth grievant "exploded" angrily when
instructed

to report

to transport

patients,

and argued

loudly with

supervision over the assignment, at a time that the grievant believed he
was on his lunch break.

It says that the grievant was so loud and

confrontational that it disturbed the Hospital's registrar and a patient
and the patient's family with whom the registrar was dealing.
It asserts that shortly thereafter on April llth, the grievant
refused to comply with his supervisor's request for details regarding an
"infectious exposure incident," when the grievant asked for an infectious
report form that he wanted to fill out; telling his supervisor instead
that he "did not want to discuss it with him."
And it asserts that on April 13th when told to report to the
Cat-Scan Department at 4:00 P.M., as the only Transporter scheduled to
work

between

4:00

P.M. and 5:00 P.M., the grievant shouted

at his

supervisor when asked about his whereabouts, "you don't ask me where I've
been or what I've been doing."
These

four

incidents

the Hospital

contends show

that the

grievant "continued a practice of not following direct orders, arguing
(over) what he did not like, and showed blatant disrespect for his
superiors."
challenging

His
to

conduct,

supervisory

claims

the

authority,

Hospital,

was

disruptive

to

argumentative,
the

Hospital's

operation,

seen and viewed as unprofessional by patients and their

families —

all intolerable in a hospital environment.

The grievant and the Union on his behalf contend that the
grievant had the right to question the assignments, especially the "crosstraining" which no other Transporter was required to undertake, and the
work orders issued and to be carried out during his meal breaks.

He

claims that he gave supervision what details he knew about the "infectious
incident"; that if he was loud or argumentative it was only in response to
arguments started by Supervisor Mathai; that he never used threatening or
profane language; that at no time did he refuse or fail to carry out the
work orders given him; and that generally, the charges against him of the
week of April 10th were in retaliation because he could not comply with
his supervisor's request that he come in an hour early on April 10th.
For reasons set forth later, the grievant's prior disciplinary
record is relevant to disposition of the instant issue.

Though the Union

attempted in this proceeding to dispute some of the prior disciplinary
actions, those actions were either not grieved or not protested to any
terminal step at and after the time imposed. Hence, they stand unrefuted
and are no longer challengeable de novo in this proceeding. One or two of
them, the Union contends, were to be withdrawn from the grievant's record
by agreement with the Hospital.
understanding.

But the Hospital denies any such

No hard evidence was offered of any such agreement.

That

being so, I find no basis upon which I could expunge these disputed
disciplinary actions from the grievant's record or disregard them.
The Union did concede and stipulated that the grievant received
ten verbal warnings for "insubordination" between February 1992 and August
1993 and that none of them were grieved.
In addition, the grievant received a written warning on June 10,
1992 for "disconnecting a patient's I.V. line despite being previously
advised and in serviced not to handle I.V..."

He was suspended for one day on September 27, 1993 for "neglect
of duty and insubordination by failing to carry out an order to go to CatScan to take a patient back to (his) floor."
He was suspended for three days in February 1994 for yelling at
a Ultrasound Technologist, for using profanity to her and shoving office
chairs around, in response to her inquiry about the whereabouts of the
patient the grievant was to transport. And for delay in carrying out the
assignment thereafter.
In July 1994 the grievant received a "Final Notice" for "gross
misconduct."
transport

He refused to carry out a direct order of supervision to

a patient requiring oxygen after being instructed where to

obtain the oxygen tanks.
In the latter notice, the grievant was told that that was his
"final warning notice"... and that "any refusal to perform
within the Department will result in his discharge."
expressly

that

"there

will

be

no

discussions

assignments

The notice stated

about

nor

repeated

instructions to perform assignments"...and that "if Mr. Navarro has a
problem with an assignment, he is reminded to strictly follow the Union
and Hospital established policies on grievances."

(Emphasis added)

In the notice of his first suspension, a copy of which he
received, the grievant was told:
"This action will be followed by further monitoring of
(his) behavior and counselling to take place when
necessary but any further occurrence of this nature
will

result

in

disciplinary

including termination."

actions

up

to

and

In the notice of his second suspension (a copy of which he also
received) he was told:
"This action will be followed by further monitoring of
(his) conduct.
of

this

If there are any further occurrences

nature...it

will

result

in

immediate

termination."
On the facts of the four incidents during the week of April
10th, I find no reason in the record to disbelieve the testimony and
versions of the events adduced by Hospital witnesses.
testimony credible and accurate.
being punished
persuasive.

I find that

The grievant's contention that he was

for not coming in early on April 10th, is just not

On the other hand, because his job is at stake, the grievant

had reasons to deny or "tone down" the allegations of argumentativeness,
disrespect and objections to work assignments.

I see no credible evidence

that supports the grievant's explanation that he was provoked or that
supervision initiated the arguments.
Standing alone, the events of the week of April 10th may fall
short of traditional insubordination. Though obviously argumentative, and
disrespectful

of

supervisory

authority, the

grievant apparently did

perform the work ordered, albeit delayed at times and grudgingly.

There

is insufficient evidence that he used profanity to supervision.
But the events of the week of April 10th do not and cannot stand
alone.

When

viewed

appropriately

against

the

backdrop

of

prior

disciplinary action, and especially the admonitions referred to above, the
grievant's conduct during the week of April 10th takes on a much more
serious and prejudicial nature.

Despite warnings not to do so (particularly and expressly set
forth in the Final Warning notice), the grievant continued to object to or
question the propriety of work orders.
training."

He argued about the "cross-

He argued about a work assignment during what he thought was

his lunch break.

He wrongly refused to give details of an "infectious

incident" when expressly asked for these details by supervision, and he
challenged supervision's authority by disrespectfully and angrily telling
supervisor Mathai not "to ask where (we'd) been and what (he'd) been
doing."
All of these acts by the grievant constituted a continuation of
an altitude and conduct for which he was previously disciplined and which
he was expressly warned would result in his discharge if continued.
grievant offers explanations for his conduct.

The

For example, I understand

his frustration over the confusion about his lunch break on April llth.
And I can understand his momentary anger at being told to work when he
thought he was at lunch.

But he was on notice not to engage in arguments

or disputes with supervision.

He was told expressly to pursue problems

with his Union and through the grievance procedure.

That is what he was

told repeatedly to do and that is what he failed to do or refused to do
during the week of April 10th.
confrontational

None of the events that week justified his

and argumental conduct

and altitude.

All

of these

circumstances, if he thought them improper, were properly subject to and
could be remedied by and through the grievance procedure, and not by
"self-help" tactics of argument, - delay and disrespect.
continued
relations.

to

violate

one

of the

best

settled

rules

In short, he
of

industrial

He engaged in oppositional conduct and attitude when he should

have forthwith complied with the work orders and resorted exclusively to
the grievance procedure and his union representation for redress.

Finally, I agree with the Hospital that this type of conduct is
especially inappropriate in a hospital setting.
procedures have top priority.

Patients and treatment

Professionalism must be maintained.

Loud

arguments between staff and supervision; delays in transporting patients;
and challenges to work orders are incompatible with professionalism and
the carrying out of the Hospital's mission.
Under all the foregoing circumstances, I deem the grievant's
overall record, culminating in the four incidents of the week of April
10th, to constitute continued behavior that is inappropriate for a staff
employee of the Hospital and contrary to the orderly rules of an employeeemployer relationship.
Prior

to

his

disciplined

but

unacceptable

conduct.

discharge,

expressly

warned

he

was

about

not

any

only

progressively

continuation

of

his

His failure to heed these proper warnings and

admonitions not only justifies his termination, but makes him wilfully
responsible for his own dismissal.
The Undersigned, duly designated as the Arbitrator, and having
duly heard the proofs and allegations of the above-named parties, makes
the following AWARD:
The discharge of EMILIO NAVARRO was for just cause.

Eric J. Schmertz, Arbitrator

DATED:

February 13, 1996

STATE OF NEW YORK
COUNTY OF NEW YORK

)
ss:
)

I, Eric J. Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my Oath as Arbitrator
that I am the individual described in and who executed this instrument,
which is my AWARD.

-x
In the Matter of the Arbitration
- Between LOCAL 6 CLUB and BARTENDERS UNION

OPINION AND AWARD

and

Case # 13 300 00082 96

THE PENN CLUB

In accordance with the arbitration provisions of the collective
bargaining

agreement between the above-named Union and Employer, the

Undersigned was selected as the arbitrator to hear and decide a dispute
relating to the Union's claim that "wages for all food servers be adjusted
to the higher rate of pay as of January 12, 1996."
A hearing was held on May 13, 1996 at which time representatives
of the above-named Union and Employer appeared.

All concerned were

afforded full opportunity to offer evidence and argument and to examine
and cross examine witnesses.

The Arbitrator's Oath was waived.

At the threshold the parties are in dispute over the scope of
the issue before the Arbitrator.

Hence they were unable to agree on a

stipulated issue.
The Union claims that food service employees ("waiters"), in
addition to their regular duties, are being required to perform duties of
other higher paid classifications —

namely duties of a bar tender,

utility worker ("steward") and bus person ("bus boy").
On behalf of the waiters the Union seeks a higher regular hourly
rate of pay in compensation for those extra duties (i.e. either the bar
tender rate, the utility worker rate or the bus person's rate).

The Employer asserts that the issue grieved is limited to a
claim for bus person's pay; that the grievance arose and was generated by
the elimination of the bus person classification and the layoff of those
so classified.

It rejects as part of the issue, on the grounds that it

was not grieved or part of the grievance meetings, any complaint regarding
the assignment of duties attendant to the bar tender classification or the
claim for the bar tender rate of pay.

And it takes the same position

regarding the allegations concerning the duties of and the claim for the
rate of pay of utility workers.
The Union's Demand for Arbitration reads:
THE NAME OF THE GRIEVANT:

All waiters in Main Dining

Room and the Grill
THE NATURE OF THE DISPUTE:

Management has chosen to

eliminate the position of busboy.

Busboys are being

laid off while food servers are asked to perform work
outside

their

regular

position.

Management

is

requiring waiters to work in more than one position
and is not paying the higher rate of pay in accordance
with the contract.
THE CLAIM OR RELIEF SOUGHT

(the Amount, if Any) :

Wages for all food servers be adjusted to the higher
rate of pay as of January 12, 1996.

There was no written grievance.
verbal.

The grievance meetings were

It

would

appear

that

the

grievance

is

protesting

the

consequences of the layoff of bus persons namely the assignment thereafter
of bus person duties to the waiters.

As such, that would confine the

scope of the issue to that protest with a remedial claim for the bus
person rate of pay.
However, absent a written grievance, the scope of the issue is
not necessarily confined to the "short-hand" wording of the Demand for
Arbitration.

Inquiry may be made about the discussions of the parties

during grievance meetings, especially where as here, arguably, the Demand
for Arbitration is ambiguous.
layoff

of the bus persons,

Though it protests the consequences of the
it also protests

the assignment

outside their regular position" (emphasis added).

of "work

This can be reasonably

interpreted to include and encompass duties of the restaurant bar tender
and/or the work of stewards.
Based on the evidence, I am persuaded that during the grievance
meetings the Union did call attention to work the waiters were doing that
previously was performed by the restaurant bar tender and the stewards, as
well as work of the bus person classification.
However, the foregoing notwithstanding, I find that the scope of
the issue is limited to the Union's claim that the waiters are required to
perform bus person duties and are entitled to bus person compensation.
I conclude that but for the layoff of the bus persons and the
undisputed assignment of their duties to the waiters, there would not have
been the instant grievance.
The facts show that the elimination of one bar tender (in the
restaurant) took place before the Union was certified as the bargaining

agent; that for many months the waiters were assigned to perform bar
tender duties (in the restaurant but not in the grill) and did it without
objection.

I conclude that they called attention to those extra duties

during the grievance meetings not to protest that work standing alone or
to seek bar tender pay, but rather to show the Employer all the "extra"
duties the waiters were assigned at the time the work of the laid off bus
persons was added.
In short, the addition of bus person's duties triggered the
grievance, and it is that additional set of duties about which the Union
grieves and for which the Union seeks additional pay for the waiters.
Otherwise
objection.

the

work

Again,

of

bar

tendering

its reference

would

have

continued

in the grievance meetings

without
was, I

conclude, to show the Employer that the waiters had assumed enough extra
work and that to take on the work of the bus persons as well was too much.
So I find that the Union was not claiming bar tender pay as part
of its grievance.
Also, as the disputed bar tender work was assigned to the
waiters before the Union's recognition, was performed without objection
and was not an issue in the negotiations of the contract, I must conclude
also that the Union and the waiters had accepted that bar tendering work
as part of their then regular duties, encompassed by practice in the
waiter

classification and the waiter rate of pay

contract.

negotiated

in the

As I understand the record some stewards work was first assigned
to

bus

persons

apparently,

to

eliminated.

when

some

waiters

stewards

when

the

were
bus

laid

person's

off

and

thereafter,

classification

was

Again, I find that this work, which originated with the

stewards,

was

cited

by the Union

and the waiters

at the grievance

meetings.

But it was cited, I find, not as independent work required of

the waiters for which they should be paid the steward's rate of pay, but
as work inherited by the waiters from the duties previously performed by
the bus persons and as part of the grievance protesting the assignment of
bus person duties to the waiters.

So, again with the elimination of bus

persons the Union's protest ran to the assignment to the waiters of whatever duties had been performed by the bus persons, with the remedial claim
limited to bus person's rate of pay.
Therefore, I deem the issue before me to be:
"Whether, because of the assignment of bus person
duties to the waiters, the waiters are entitled to the
bus person rate of pay or bus person compensation."
Unlike my ruling on the work of bar tendering by the waiters,
which I found not to be encompassed in the issue grieved and as an
integral

part

negotiated
foregoing

of the waiters

in the
issue,

contract,
that

job when the pay
I do not

steward

work

find

for the waiters was

or rule, by framing the

is properly part

of the waiters

classification, or that waiters were properly assigned those

duties.

Rather, I find only that a claim for the stewards rate of pay was not part
of the grievance.

It is unclear in the record whether, when the pay rate

of the waiter classification was negotiated, or more significantly, when
the parties negotiated the side letter of

December 18, 1995 (Joint Exhibit la) dealing with the elimination of the
bus person classification and the assumption of bus person duties by the
waiters, the parties
performing

some

assignment

of

knew or contemplated that the bus persons were

steward

bus

work

person

or understood or contemplated that the

work

by the waiters

and the

rate

of pay

negotiated then, would include a take over by the waiters of whatever
steward duties had been assumed by the bus persons.

Those questions are

not before me and are not disposed of by my Award on the issue I have
framed.

The rights of the parties on these questions are therefore

expressly reserved.

Put another way, an objection by the Union to the

assignment of steward work to the waiters and/or a claim for steward pay
remains grievable and arbitrable.

It was just not part of the grievance

in this case.
However,
mandated

a negative answer to the issue

by express negotiated

agreements

between

I have framed is
the Union and the

Employer.
Schedule A (Employer's Exhibit 3) of the collective bargaining
agreement sets forth the rates of pay for the waiters.

The Employer's

testimony that the rates of pay for the waiters and the increases therein
took into consideration the addition of bus person's duties was unrefuted.
Schedule A must be read in conjunction with the side letter of December
18, 1995 (Joint Exhibit la) .

Both Schedule A and the side letter were

negotiated or agreed to at the time the contract was consummated.

The

side letter expressly provides for the assumption of bus person duties by
the waiters.

I find that it is silent on the matter of pay for that

assumption because the pay question, with

cognizance of the added duties, was dealt with and agreed to in Schedule
A.

In short, the side letter provided for the take over by the waiters of

the bus person duties and Schedule A provided the wage rates and wage
increases for waiters, with contemplation of those additional duties.
On that basis, the Union's claim for bus person's pay for the
waiters for the performance of work previously done by bus persons , is
denied without

prejudice

to the question of whether those additional

duties and the rate of pay properly include work previously or regularly
performed by stewards.
The Undersigned duly designated as the Arbitrator, and having
duly heard the proofs and allegations of the above-named parties, makes
the following AWARD:
The Union's grievance on behalf of the waiters, as set
forth in the Demand for Arbitration dated January 19,
1996, and limited to the claim for the bus person's
rate of pay, is denied.

Eric J. Schmertz, Arbitrator

DATED:

May 30, 1996

STATE OF NEW YORK

)

COUNTY OF NEW YORK

)

ss:
I, Eric J. Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my Oath as Arbitrator
that I am the individual described in and who executed this instrument,
which is my AWARD.

AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION,
ADMINISTRATOR
-X

IN THE MATTER OF THE ARBITRATION
between
OPEIU, LOCAL 153
OPINION AND AWARD
and

Case #133000069096
PROFESSIONAL STAFF CONGRESS
-X

The issue is:
What shall be the disposition of the grievance of OLGA
GERENA?
A hearing was held on September 16, 1996 at which time Ms.
Gerena, hereinafter referred to as the "grievant" and representatives of
Local 153, hereinafter referred to as the "Union," and Professional Staff
Congress,

hereinafter

referred

to as the

"Employer" appeared.

All

concerned were afforded full opportunity to offer evidence and argument
and to examine and cross-examine witnesses.

The Arbitrator's Oath was

waived.
I deem the "grievance" to be set forth in a letter dated March
26, 1996 from Charles L. Smith, the Union's Business Representative to Dr.
Frank R. Armuziato, the Employer's Executive Director.

In pertinent part

it reads:
Since we have been unable to reach an agreement on the
reinstatement of OLGA WERBETSKI (GERENA, [e.s.]) to
her former position at PSC, the Union has decided to
pursue the matter in arbitration.

Based on the evidence and undisputed facts, I conclude, as a
matter of law, that there is one agreement that controls this matter and
that it is manifested in two forms — verbally and by an unsigned writing.
If the former, namely the verbal agreement, is proved, it is the
enforceable

agreement

and

the written

recitation

thereof

is merely

ministerial.
On the other hand, if the verbal agreement is not proved and/or
if barred by the Statute of Frauds, then the written document must be
resorted to as the controlling document.

And because in this case that

document is unsigned and contains express language making it unenforceable
unless signed, an enforceable agreement cannot be proved, and no agreement
between the Employer and the grievant would exist.
However,

I am fully

satisfied

that

the parties

reached a

complete verbal agreement; that it was supported by consideration; that it
was properly relied on by the Employer; that it's substantive terms were
clear and undisputed and that the Employer could be held to those terms
and to its performance.

With these factual findings, the verbal agreement

is removed from the Statute of Frauds.
The written document, reciting the terms of the agreement, need
not therefore be proved or resorted

to prove the agreement

and its

provision of unenforceability unless signed, simply does not come into
play.
The essential facts are not in dispute.
disciplinary

suspension

the

grievant, on

"disability" leave because of pregnancy.

Following a one-week

November

1,

1995

went

She and/or the Union on her

on

Dehalf shortly thereafter notified the Employer that she decided not to
return to her job as legal assistant to the Employer's general counsel;
that she wanted to stay at home to take care of her baby after its birth;
and that she wanted to negotiate a severance package.
so authorized,

Charles L. Smith, the Union's

On her behalf and

Business

Representative

opened negotiations with Sheri Skolnick, the Employer's office manager on
the terms of a severance package for the grievant's severance from the
Employer's employ.

The negotiations went on for several weeks.

On or about December 21st, Smith notified Skolnick that a
severance proposal offered by the Employer and similar to or the same as
an earlier plan for another employee, Robin Caines, was acceptable to the
grievant and that all issues were resolved.

Smith then went on vacation

until January 8, 1996.
Ms.

Skolnick

wrote

the

following memo to her

file, dated

December 20, 1995:
I spoke with Charles Smith today, and he said that
OLGA WERBETSKI agreed to the following:
4 weeks salary;
5 weeks severance;
1 week vacation; and
Letter of employment.
Charles said that we should put together an agreement
dated 1/1/96 and effective on that day.

He said we

should use the agreement that was written for Robin
Caines,

and use

similar language.

vacation until 1/8/96.

Charles

is on

In anticipation

of and then in reliance on the grievant's

intention and decision not to return to work and the aforesaid severance
terms, the Employer, beginning in December (but earlier than December 21)
posted and thereafter advertised for a replacement for the grievant.
There were no internal bids but were several responses to the
ads.

Interviews of applicants were held and one was offered and accepted

the position on January 4th.

She gave notice to her then employer and

began work with the Employer January 22nd, replacing the grievant.
The Employer reduced the terms of the severance package to a
formal written document in traditional contract form and faxed it to Smith
on January llth.

The written document was never signed, because by then

the grievant had suffered a miscarriage and, as Smith said "had changed
her mind" about leaving.

Smith notified the Employer that the grievant

wanted to return to work and to her job. He claimed she had a right to do
so because of "changed circumstances"; because the formal document was not
signed as required by its terms to be effective;1 and because she was
"returning" from disability.
The grievant admits the foregoing events.

She admits that she

originally notified the Employer of her decision not to return to work.
She admits that the severance package was originally acceptable to her and
that

she agreed

employment.

to

it in consideration for the termination of her

She acknowledges that she changed her mind when she lost her

baby.

!That

language reads:
"This settlement agreement shall be effective
and binding only when signed by all of the
parties...."

The Union asserts that the grievant had the right to change her
mind because the severance agreement was not finalized in writing and
signed; that a signed document was necessary because the Union had told
the Employer to give the grievant the same package as was given Caines and
that an essential part of that earlier deal was that it was put in writing
and signed.

Also, the Union argues that the grievant had the general

right to return to work following a "disability," and that the Employer
"jumped the gun" by recruiting a replacement before the agreement was
final.

It asserts that the grievant should not be held responsible for

any harsh results to the replacement employee if removed from the job by
the grievant's reinstatement.
It is manifestly apparent to me that the parties reached a
verbal agreement.

The grievant was severing her employment.

Her notice

and that of the Union on her behalf was unequivocal on that point.
severance was

supported

recommendation.
ommunicated

and a letter of

The consideration was acceptable to the grievant and so

to

reservations.

by economic considerations

The

the

Employer.

Substantively

reference as was given Caines.

It

was

unconditional

and

it was

the

same

package and

economic

without

And the Employer relied on its finality

and completeness.
On those bases I find that the Employer had reasonable and
proper grounds

to

so rely

especially when the

job involved was an

important one and the general counsel needed it filled expeditiously.
That it began recruiting for a replacement even before the December 21st
date of "agreement" on the severance terms, is therefore understandable.
And because ultimately

an unconditional severance plan was agreed to,

albeit verbal, any "premature" action was ratified by that agreement.

Did the grievant have the right to "change her mind" because of
hanged circumstances"; because of the lack of signature on the formal
written document which by its terms was not enforceable unless signed;
and/or because the "deal" was not the same as was offered Caines in that
Lt was not formally consummated by a signed writing?
My answers are in the negative.

At no time was the grievant's

notice of her decision to sever her employment conditioned on the birth of
ler baby.

That was an implied if not express reason for her decision, but

the decision

itself

was unconditional.

Put another way, I find no

controlling reason why the Employer had to await the birth or anticipate
that she would want to return to work if the child was not born, before it
made irrevocable arrangements to seek and obtain a replacement for the
undisputedly

important

general counsel.

job of legal secretary

(or assistant)

to the

So, the "changed circumstances," though unfortunate and

for which I have a personal sympathy, was not a reservation of any right
revoke a decision to sever he employment or to revoke a bilateral
agreement to do so.

Her decision not to return to work and that bilateral

agreement to do so ended or extinguished any re-employment rights she may
lave had arising from her status on disability leave.
Because the full written agreement is pre-empted by the prior
verbal understanding and need not therefore be proved to prove the agreedto arrangement, the fact that it was unsigned and contained conditional
language, is not controlling.
favor

the grievant,

In short, there are equitable factors that

but not the controlling

contract

law.

In that

circumstance the latter prevails, and the Arbitrgator is so bound.
The "difference" from the Caines settlement is not persuasively
probative.

I am not satisfied that the Union's request that the instant

settlement

follow

the

Caine

"formula"

included, as an essential

material term, the requirement that it be in writing and signed.

or

I am

satisfied that the request that it follow the Caine settlement meant that
it be substantively

the same, specifically in economic terms and the

letter of recommendation.

In that essential respect the verbal agreement

with the grievant and the signed written agreement with Caines were the
ame.
Frankly,

I believe that the Union's

request

for a signed,

written document was, in both cases, a traditional precaution to be able
to prove the "deal" and to remove any verbal agreement from later disputes
and other impediments under the Statute of Frauds.
to prove a contract that is in writing and signed.
contract is more difficult to prove.
as enforceable.

In short, it is easier
Admittedly, a verbal

But if proved, as here, it is just

This burden of proof, I believe, is what prompted the

conditional language in the Caines case and, by happenstance and by simple
copying, it found its way into the unsigned document in the grievant's
case.

As such,

condition

to

I do not find that it was a material or essential

what

otherwise

was

a

full,

completed and

enforceable

agreement, albeit verbal.
Also, there

is no evidence in this record

that the Caine

agreement could not have been proved and made effective if only verbal.
That was never an issue or tested, because in that case there was a
written, signed document, that would prove the severance plan, if proof in
that case was necessary.

The Undersigned, duly designated as the Arbitrator, and having
duly heard the proofs and allegations of the above-named parties, makes
the following AWARD:
The grievance of OLGA GERENA is denied.

The parties

are directed to implement the severance package agreed

to.

Eric J. Schmertz
DATED:

September 30, 1996

STATE OF NEW YORK

)
: ss.
COUNTY OF NEW YORK )

I, Eric J. Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my Oath as Arbitrator
that I am the individual described in and who executed this instrument,
which is my AWARD.

